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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The international legal regime as it pertains to human rights is neither as
established nor as definitive as it appears. They suffer from many disadvantages. First and
most of all, despite an enormous normative development and wave of changes, the
international legal regime has never been capable of providing for effective enforcement
of its rules or instituting appropriate remedies for its breaches. Unlike other bilateral and
multilateral treaties which have usually been norm setting, states accede to human rights
instruments either because they think that they incorporate moral values which are
aspirational, or because they realize that human rights are simply "norm-setting" as
opposed to "lawmaking" in the contractual sense of the term. The acquiescence of states
is likely to disappear when the "law" requires positive implementation.
Lack of an effective tool of implementation is the birth defect of almost all human
rights instruments and customary rules of international law pertaining to the field of
human rights. Some states have attempted to fill these lacunae by undertaking an
enforcement mechanism either unilaterally or multilaterally. Economic sanctions have
often been regarded as valuable tools of enforcement to be used against those countries
which are allegedly engaged in the suppression ofhuman rights.
This rationale has always created fricdon between states which were " enforcers of
human rights norms" and those which were alleged to be wrongdoers. Despite the fact
1
2that almost all nations of the world have bound themselves in one or another multilateral
human rights obligation, their view instantly change when these obligations involve
enforcement. As mentioned earlier, most countries do not have an actual intent to be
bound by human rights obligations and their acquiescence, which rests on political or a
moral precept, is tentative at best. Consequently, a defaulting state may become highly
defensive when other states attempt to enforce these norms using one or the other
mechanism of enforcement, mainly economic sanctions. The inadvertence to accept any
coercive measures for human rights purposes has its own practical as well as legal
grounds. From a practical aspect, they argue that most human rights are culture specific or
development oriented, and an attempt to coerce states to comply with certain kinds of
human rights does not serve any purpose other than to impose one country's cultural
values on other countries. From another angle, they challenge the legal validity of
economic sanctions.
This thesis will attempt to examine the validity of the use of economic sanctions
from the legal perspective. Because some practical questions may be pertinent in
examining the legitimacy of economic sanctions for human rights purposes, the paper will
discuss the validity of these measures in light of the existing rules of international law and
the effect of some practical problems in using this remedy.
Chapter II discusses the nature and types of economic sanctions. Despite using the
term sanction to denote positive sanctions at times, the thesis employs the normal usage of
the meaning of the term, which usually implies negative or coercive measures.
The third chapter deals with certain legal and theoretical considerations and
problems underlying international human rights law. Although there are no generally
3accepted theoretical foundations for human rights, space considerations preclude a
comprehensive discussion of the complex debates underlying the universality of human
rights. However, the paper is not guided by the notion that all human rights are coequal,
nor that they all deserve equal treatment. This section is relevant to the overall theme of
the paper in that it depicts the problem in the system of enforcement of international
human rights law. The legal validity of economic sanction as a mechanism of inducing
compliance on a target state will first and a foremost trigger the question of whether there
are universal norms to comply with or not. Views are divergent on many issues of human
rights, as are attempts to enforce human rights at a universal level. One's view on the
validity of sanction is partly conditioned on the issue existence of a definitive norm of
human rights and its firm normative basis. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to
examine this vast and complex area, which may lead to all kinds of complexities, it will
proceed on the assumption that certain kinds of human rights are natural and are not
subservient to the cultural values of any system. It will henceforth try to identify those
particular kinds of human rights which are universally accepted and which are expedient
in most cultures of the world. The paper argues in favor of the enforcement of these basic
"core" rights on an international level.
The issue of the legality of economic coercion or its normative nature is a very
controversial area. However, the right of one country to impose economic sanctions on
another is presented as knowing no limit under international law unless the economic
measure itself breached a certain legal obligation without a sound legal justification.
Scholars holding such a viewpoint completely deny the subjection of any economic
measure to a legality test by contending that such a right is inherent in the sovereignty of
4states and by overemphasing the right of nations to decide which nations should be their
trading partners. The matter, however, cannot be simply stated and should not be
oversimplified. The validity of economic coercive measures entails the application of
many controversial principles of international law, and each example of economic
coercion should be examined within its own context. For instance, economic measures
enacted to obtain trade benefits in cases in which the donor has no legal obligation to give
or continue to give aid to the donee will pose a different legal ramification of coercion
than those economic threats which are created with respect to legal entitlement, such as
denial of MFN treatment under the GATT. Whereas it may be possible to classify the
former under retorsion since it is of lesser significance in international law, the latter
could be considered illegal unless it was preceded by an illegal act. Consequently, the
issue of the normative significance of economic coercion will be seen from two
perspectives: either as an act of retortion or an act of reprisal.
First, the legality of retortive economic sanctions will be the examined. Then, a
discussion follows on the use of economic sanctions as a form of reprisals. First, this
paper will analyze economic sanctions to see if they constitute the use of force, and if so,
it will examine the current firm prohibition under international law of the use of forcible
countermeasures. In this case scenario, economic sanctions are not generally regarded as
legally justified countermeasures for whatever purpose they are imposed, including that
of human rights.
Alternatively, this paper will consider the argument that economic sanctions are
non-forcible measures. The gist of the analysis rests on the issue of whether the use of
economic sanctions constitutes a legitimate countermeasure. In the first part, an attempt
5will be made to see the validity of economic sanctions in their generic effects; not directly
pertaining to the enforcement of international human rights law but to the body of
international law. Here again, the issue will be analyzed from two important aspects of
international law: (1) the international law regulating the use of non-forcible
countermeasures and (2) those principles of international law prohibiting the non-
intervention of states. Acknowledging the fact that economic sanctions generally
constitute a legitimate countermeasure (reprisal) if they are taken in response to a
preceding illegal act, the legality of economic sanctions will be subjected to conditions
provided under the various principles of international law in this area. The whole scheme
and analysis could and should be transposed and applied to analyze the legality of using
economic sanctions to enforce human rights. The issue of legality will be seen also in
few of the various multilateral legal instruments like the GATT and the Charter of the
Organization of American States.
It is worth emphasizing from the outset that contemporary literature in this
particular area of international law does not totally support the idea that imposing
economic sanction is a sovereign right of the sanctioning state. Nonetheless, as
mentioned previously and as will be discussed thoroughly in the ensuing sections,
unilateral economic sanctions produce a more complex legal consequence than do
universal sanctions, since the legitimacy of the latter types of sanctions emanates mainly
from international law. Due to differences in their nature and legal complexity, unilateral
and universal economic sanctions will be discussed separately in this paper. Most of this
section will be devoted to analyzing the validity of unilateral economic sanctions. In a
separate chapter, the legitimacy of utilizing collective sanctions will be emphasized.
6Accordingly, those norms of human rights with a universal character will be identified,
and the need for these universal norms to be enforced through the system of the United
Nations will be set forth. The benefits of collective sanction will also be considered from
a practical angle.
For the purpose of the paper, the terms countermeasure, reprisal and economic
sanction are used interchangeably.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN GENERAL
A. Definition of Economic Sanctions
Sanctions generally denote the specific process of law enforcement applied in
response to a breach of a certain norm, which may be established by custom or required by
law, with a purpose of inducing compliance. Similarly, economic sanction may be
defined, in very simple terms, as a tool employed by one or many states to influence the
behavior of another state through the use of economic power as a weapon. Slight
differences, however, emerge in some definitions based on the effects of economic
sanctions, which may be either deprivatory or retaliatory in nature. This paper will use the
definition of Makio Miyagawa, which combines both meanings. According to Miyagawa,
economic sanction is:
the use of economic capacity by one international actor, be it a state or
' MARGARET P. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT I
(1971)Economic sanctions will be discussed distinctly from economic welfare which refers to a situation of
economic coercive measures in time of war as part of the general military effort. The former is a peacetime
remedy as opposed to the latter one. For the discussion of the distinction between the two notions
,
see M..S
DAOUDI & M.S. DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 7 (1983).
The words embargoes and boycotts are usually interchangeably used with economic sanctions. This
does not however mean that all three refer to the same situation. Whereas a sanction is a term that
incorporates the notion of both an embargo and a boycott, the meaning of the latter is independent of each
other. Embargo is defined as a prohibition or a restriction of the export of certain goods and services to the
target state by one or many concerting states to achieve a particular goal. Boycott on the other hand refers to
a situation where the receiving state refrains from importing goods and services from the target state. For a
detailed discussion on the differences, see DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra, at 8-9.
8international organization, or by a group of such actors, against another
international actor, or group of actors, with the intention of [pjunishing the
latter for its breach of a certain rule or preventing it from infringing the rule
which the party applying the sanction deems important.
Some of the constitutive components of the definition need emphasis. The
definition, first of all, notes that economic sanctions can only be imposed by a state or
group of states against another state, which are the main actors under international law
and whose conduct is regulated by international law. Hence, economic sanction is a
means by which a state may be compelled to conform to a certain conduct. The subject of
an economic sanction is a state, whereas the sanction-imposing entity may be one state, a
group of states or an international organization which is constituted of sovereign equals.
The definition further denotes that sanctions are imposed to serve as either punitive or
preventive measures. It is also indicated in the last phrase of the definition that economic
coercion may not necessarily be used to enforce international law but also a tool at the
disposal of states of states to further a country's national policies and interests. Shortly, the
use of sanction, by its very nature, demonstrates the desire of the sanction-imposing state
to "interfere in the decision-making process of another foreign government."
Nevertheless, it is common place to mention that economic sanctions are mostly the
prerogatives of powerful nations, those nations that are the dominant players in
international relations.
An economic sanction may fail to achieve its desired goal for any of several
reasons. For example, the means used by the sanction-imposing state may not exert
^ MAKIO MITAGAWA, DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK? 7 (1992).
For a similar definition, also see J. Galtung , On the Effects ofInternational Economic Sanctions,
World Politics, Vol.XIX, No. 3(1967), P.379.
^ GARY C.HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:HISTIRORY AND
CURRENT POLICY 6 (2d ed. 1990).
'*
See/t/. at 10.
9enough pressure to achieve the designated goal.^ Or the target state, by attracting other
commercial trading partners, may be able to withstand the economic pressure applied by
the sanction-imposing state. In addition, economic sanctions can backfire by triggering
an intense nationalistic reaction, thereby creating a climate of political integration rather
than one of disintegration in the target state/
B. Types of Economic Sanctions
Based on the objective dictates of situations, the motives accompanying them and
the significance of the breach of the norm, if any, the number of sanction-imposing states
may vary from one to many to almost all states. Therefore, sanctions can be categorized
as either unilateral or universal measures.
1. Universal Economic Sanctions
These kinds of sanctions are imposed by all or almost all states through the
instrumentality of global organizations. Their imposition usually follows an action that is
o
considered to be a blatant violation of international law by the international community.
The adoption of such a measure is at once a manifestation of how far the target state has
crossed the boundary of international conduct and how much the international community
^ Id. at \2.
'id
7
TTie failure or marginal outcome of some economic sanctions has been largely attributed to nationalistic
reaction triggered by the measures. The ineffectiveness of the League's sanction against Italy for its
aggression in Ethiopia in 1935-1936, Soviet sanction against Yugoslavia between 1948-1955, US
economic pressure against Indonesia in 1963-66, and US sanction against Nicaragua in the 1980s was
mainly attributed to this factor. See Id.at 12-13, (discussing the limitations on the use of sanctions.)
The economic sanction of the League against Italy did not make Italy change its mind about its aggression
against Ethiopia; also, the Arab Oil embargo, which followed the US supply of arms to Israel during the
Yom Kippur war, did not force the US to refrain from doing so, even though the measure resulted in
domestic political tension. Neither the Soviet Union's economic sanction against Yugoslavia for its loose
solidarity with the Socialist camp, nor that of US against Cuba, which was triggered by the pursuit of its
national interest, brought about a significant outcome. See MITAGAWA, supra note 2, at 206-207.
^ WILLIAM H. KAEMPFER & ANTON D. LONERBERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, 16 (1992).
10
is displeased with the target's behavior.
The use of universal economic sanctions dates back to the creation of the League
of Nations. The emergence of the League of Nations marked the creation of an
"international system of guarantee and punishment" for the first time in the history of
international relations. Its establishment heralded the possibility of using international
enforcement and with it emerged the idea of using sanctions in a global perspective.^
The Covenant of the League, which came into existence in 1916, devised a security
mechanism through collective sanctioning. Article XXI of the Covenant provided for the
taking of a measure against a member if it resorted to war in breach of the Covenant.
Although the word "sanction" was not expressly used , the Covenant mandated the
imposition of economic measures as follows:
Member states were to subject the law-breaking nation to the severance of
all trade and financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between
their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the
prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse of any
12
Other state, whether it was a member of the League or not.
The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, mainly due to the
failure of the former to achieve its purpose of maintaining world order. At present, the
United Nations is the global organization with the power of imposing mandatory
^ DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra notel, at 56.
'%^. at 56.
'
' See DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note 1, at Sl{citmg E.P. Walters, A History of the League).
''id.
The League of Nations applied this device of collective security for the first time against Italy for
its act of aggression against Ethiopia in November 1935. This economic sanction included an embargo on
the shipment of arms, the prohibition of loans and the extension of credit, an interdict on imports from the
offending country and exports of many manufactured goods and raw materials needed to carry on the war.
DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note I, at 63 {citing Anderson, Modern Europe in World Perspective, at 479)
11
economic sanctions through the Security Council. ^^ Rhodesia was the first country to
experience a United Nations sanction.'"^ This sanction was blessed by many as a landmark
decision heralding the use of collective enforcement measures of the Security Council
under article 4 1 of the Charter. One observer remarked, "The mandator}' sanctions are
unprecedented, never having been used before. Great powers had, for the first time, not
only agreed to accept sanctions but have pushed to get them adopted. The implications,
however weak this first step, are momentous."'^
One disadvantage of universal economic sanction is more evident: the lack of
effective implementation due to the evasion of responsibilities by member states.
Although certain resolutions of the Security Council derive their legality from the Charter
of the United Nations and, in principle at least, states have agreed to comply with its
decisions, the effective implementation of these decisions depends on the attitude and
commitment of each member state.
After deciding on the existence of the breach or threat to the peace, the Security Council can impose
economic sanction as an enforcement action under article 41 of the Charter. Article 41 reads thus: "The
Security Council can decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations."
14
The British government agreed to grant independence to Rhodesia on the condition that it would be a
democracy ruled by the black majority, but this plan was circumvented when the white minority led by
Prime Minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence from the British Empire. The
unilateral declaration was held to be illegal by the international community and the authority of Ian Smith
was challenged as being without any legal validity. See DAOUDI AND DAJANI, supra note 1, at 77-82.
'^ DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra I
,
at 80 {citing A.G. MESERIK, RHODESIA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS).
The motive for evading a universal sanction can be attributed for three reasons: political symphaty, cost
of effective compliance and greed. See Douglas G. Anglin, United Nations and International Economic
Sanctions Against South Africa and Rhodesia, in THE UTILITY OF fNTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS, 38-39 (DAVID LEYTON-BROWN, ed., 1987)
Albeit its universal character, the execution of universal sanctions falls totally in the hands of the
national systems, which may subject it to a certain danger of evasion. During the U.N. sanction against
Rhodesia for instance. United States after initial compliance with the sanction, adopted the Byrd
Amendment, which lifted the embargo against the importation of Rhodesia's chrome. Moreover, countries
like Portugal and South Africa defied their obligations for one or another political, economic or
'"''^~™'''^''''"'''^^
12
Be this as may, universal economic sanctions are desirable both in terms of their
legitimacy and the relative attainment of the intended result. The validity of the legal
framework imposing these sanctions, the number of states taking active part in their
implementation, and the apparent nature of the breach of international law is critical in
determining the legitimacy and relative effectiveness of sanctions.'^ The implementation
of a universal decision that utilizes economic sanctions against a designated country is
more difficult to achieve in the face of diverse interest of states and opposing views and
values. Also, in some cases a government may feel responsible for the domestic interests
of a target state and will not want to increase its risks and costs.
2. Unilateral Economic Sanctions
These are sanctions undertaken by a single or a group of states. Although
"unilateral" numerically refers to a single entity, the paper assumes that multilateral
ideological reason. Had it not been for such defiance by the sanction violators, the Rhodesian government
would not have had a prolonged life. Id. at 38-39.
In the 1966 mandatory sanction against Rhodesia, a mechanism was devised through which the
Secretary General of the United Nations would make a regular report on the implementation. In May 1968,
a security Council sanction committee was formed to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive
sanction subsequently imposed, this Committee was authorized to examine the reports of the Secretariat,
seek information on the implementation of the sanction from members and some other alleged sanction
breaking members. This committee had some difficulties in obtaining the information it sought from the
member states; some governments failed to respond to the requests; some delayed or sent a complicated or
apathetic replies. This made the task of the committee unexpectedly hard. MARGARET DOXEY,
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 107-108 (1987).
17
M.Jenneffer Mackay, Economic Sanctions: Are they Actually Enforcing International Law In Serbia-
Monte Negro, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 208 (1995).
The efficacy of economic sanctions in causing the intended economic leverage may depend on the
comprehensiveness of the sanction and the number of nations participating. The higher the number of
participating nations, the lesser the chance of obtaining an alternative import and export market to the
target state. Consequently, non-compliance of an international call for sanctions against the target may
circumvent the effectiveness of economic sanctions. See WILLIAM H.KAEMFER AND ANTONY D.
LOWENBERG, INTERNATIONAL SANCTION PERSPECTIVE 65(1992).
'^ DOXEY, Supra note 16, at 90.
13
sanctions are essentially unilateral because they are imposed by a group of countries
sharing common values and perceptions and narrow interests. It is a common place to
say that this kind of sanction is the prerogative of big powers, which retain the economic
capability of manipulating situations to their own national interests. Unilateral sanctions
have been deployed in pursuit of a number of national interest and foreign goals and
motives.
Unilateral sanctions have also been deployed as coercive instruments to achieve
more modest purposes, such as helping to promote human rights, settling expropriation
claims and discouraging terrorism. Here, too, the United States has been the leading
player, acting as a "guardian of its own version of global morality," employing
economic pressure to help influence the human rights situations in Haiti, Burma, Somalia
and the Sudan.
Unilateral sanctions are also utilized by states either in groups or through
multilateral organizations for a multitude of purposes. Organized unilateral sanctions,
which may also be called multilateral sanctions, have been deployed in order to
accomplish a common goal. During the cold war, which was characterized by a bipolar
ideological conflict between the East and the West, for example, most countries allied or
19
Efforts to destabilize governments were used during the cold war era when the superpowers sought to
bring other nations under their ideological sphere of influences. US unilateral sanctions contributed fairly
significantly to the overthrow of the Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973, and the Brazilian dictator
Jaol Goularin in 1964. On the contrary, the three decade comprehensive sanction of the United States
against Cuba has not yet achieved its intended result. Id. at 5-7.
Similarly, the former Soviet Union had deployed an economic leverage to maintain her
hegemony during the cold world war. One illustration to this effect is the infliction of economic sanction of
the Soviet union against Yugoslavia in 1948 for the latter's defection from the former's sphere of influence
which was perceived by the former as a threat to regional stability and security. See DAOUDI & DAJANI,
supranoXe 1, at 123-24.
20
HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 6.
£i^BS^^^^SES^^3^H
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identified themselves with this or that ideological bloc, and each bloc attempted to restrict
the free trade of the other.
The boycott of Iranian oil, 1951-1953, was a typical example of the joint response
by the Western Bloc to the nationalization of the Iran's oil industry by the Iranian
government, as led by Mohammed Mossadeq in 1951.^^ The Arab oil embargo of 1973-
74 on the developed world is another example of the sanction by a concerted effort of
multiple states. This embargo is an exception to the general practice that economic
coercion is a tool only at the disposal of developed western nations. In another episode,
in which the Iranian government seized the US embassy in Teheran and took hostages of
52 diplomatic personnel, members of the European Community and other industrialized
countries cooperated with the United States by restricting their trade with Iran to a certain
extent.
Unilateral economic sanctions are also sponsored by multilateral or regional
organizations. The Organization of American States and the European Union are
examples of regional organizations that apply economic coercion. " In such unilateral
^' DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note 1, at 91-92.
22
This embargo boycotted the importation of Iranian oil by the West and eventually became the major
cause for the fall of the government. See Id. at 95.
23
The Arab oil producing countries controlled the production and exportation of oil to the developed
countries so as to coerce them use their influence on Israel to evacuate territories which it had occupied
during the 1967 war. Id at 104-105.
^"^ DOXEY, supra note 16, at 33.
25
In one instance involving acts of aggression in Venezuela, and the attempted assassination of its
president by the Trujillo regime of the Dominican government, the OAS first adopted, in August 1960, a
unanimous resolution calling for a partial interruption of economic relations. Later, in January 1961, the
OAS extended the embargo to include important commodities such as petroleum. In another episode in
1962, the member states of the OAS decided to discontinue trade with Cuba because of its express
ijjiiiiLiiiiiaft—aa^HiM^
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sanctions involving groups of states sharing a common value, there is a higher possibility
of procuring a commonality of shared values and perceptions than is prevalent in
universal sanctions. Consequently, they are more likely to be implemented than are
universal sanctions.27
C. Means of Economic Sanctions
Under the heading of economic sanctions are included certain methods of
implementation. These could generally be grouped into the following categories: trade
sanctions, financial sanctions and development aid sanctions.
1. Trade Sanctions
Trade embargoes presuppose a restriction in the flow of goods, both imports and
exports. The regulations of imports and exports is a method of affecting an economic
sanction, be it through a unilateral or a universal sanction. The trade embargo may take
the form of an active embargo, in which the sanction- imposing state actively refuses or
blocks the imports of goods and services from the target state. Similarly, the trade
embargo may be passive, an embargo in which the sanction-imposing state abstains from
28
exporting its goods and services to the target state.
Whereas export controls have an impact on the target's economy in a direct
allegiance to the communist ideology. Id. at 60.
^^/^. at90.
27 For example, see DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note 1, at 167. See also id. at 143.
28
Passive embargoes are also known as economic boycotts or export embargoes while active embargoes
have been described as import embargoes or economic blockades. See C. LLOYD BROWN-JOHN,
MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1975).
16
manner, import controls do so in an indirect manner.'^^ Import controls are generally
easier for the imposing state to apply; however, complexities surrounding the assessment
of the value-added content of goods may make determination of the goods difficult.^°
The target country may attempt to penetrate the market of the sanction-imposing state
through a triangular purchase arrangement.^' Complications arise when these goods are
sent through a third state, which the sanction-imposing state has no power to control,
unless the third state allows an extra-territorial application of the foreign law of the
sanction-imposmg state m its domestic jurisdiction. These problems are more apparent
in unilateral economic sanctions than in universal ones, since the number of the sanction-
imposing states reduces the likelihood of using third states.
2. Financial Sanctions
29
While export embargoes deprive the target of needed commodities, import embargoes deprive the target
of the resources to finance the importation of these products. They attack the target's abiHty to purchase in
the international market. Export restrictions without import embargoes may preserve the purchasing
capacity of the target, allowing it to obtain the goods that it needs from other sources. Thus, import
embargoes are more effective because they exert a heavier economic leverage on the target. See generally
MIYAGAWA, 5wpra note 2, at 16-18.
If a unilateral sanction is imposed, the target may be able to substitute goods that are banned by
the export embargoes and find an alternative market for the supply of the goods at a slightly higher price.
This may not be possible, however, because the impact on the existing trade relationship between the target
and the sanction-imposing state is particularly effective during the pre-sanction era. The tighter the
economic link is between the target and the sanction-enforcing state, the greater the impact on the target. If
the target is cut off from its potentially extensive export market, exporters in the target state may be
compelled to offer a lower price to customers in the new market. Similarly, if there is an import ban from a
major exporting country, target importers are likely to encounter higher prices as they attempt to buy from
an alternative market. See generally KAEMPFER &LOWENBERG, supra note 1 7, at 66.
Although many countries have rules of origin in their trade laws, it is a practical problem for the
enforcing state to verify the origin of commodities. In cases of export embargoes (passive embargoes), the
sanction-imposing state may not be able to control the destination of its goods, except to make sure that
they are not shipped directly to the target state. BROWN-JOHN, supra note 27, at 28.
^' HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 36. See also MIYAGAWA, ssupra note 1, at 61-64.
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The issue of transshipment of goods poses a complicated situation in applying trade embargoes.
Transshipment is a process in which the goods of one state are transferred to another via a third or fourth
state. See MIYAGAWA, ssupra note 1, at 61-64. Also, see BROWN-JOHN, supra note 28, at 21-24.
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A healthy and growing economy must acquire foreign development capital in the
forms of credit, exchange reserves, facilities for the sale of bonds, a growing trade, and
bilateral and multilateral financial assistance. Hence, denial of access to foreign capital
is one form of economic sanction. Refusing to grant a previously arranged credit
arrangement with the target, blocking an acquisition loan on the international money
market and ft^eezing bank assets are some of the techniques of maneuvering finance to
influence the target. The freezing of assets and influence through financial institutions
such as the IMF and the World Bank has been particularly effective. This type of
sanction works on the assumption that a target state would gradually collapse if its
"foreign capital sources were controlled and international exchange sources were
exhausted."
3. Sanctions Through the Use of Development Assistance
Foreign aid is a very powerful weapon at the disposal of the developed world
against the third world.^^ The efficacy and the destabilizing effect of this kind of sanction
depends on whether the development aid deprived or provided to the target state is a
" See BROWN-JOHN, supra note 28, at 28.
^^ HUFBAUER ET AL, supra note 3, at 28.
''id.
The act of giving development aid to stimulate compliance to the demands of the donating state is
known as a positive sanction since it is motivational in purpose. . Similarly, the act of withholding aid by
the sanctioning state for actions by the target that the donor considers to be unlawful or unpleasant is
known as a negative sanction. See MIYAGAWA, supra note, at 28.
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substantial contribution to its economy.
Foreign aid has been applied for a variet}' of reasons, the motives varying from a
purely political motive, to a technique of law enforcement, to an altruistic motive.
Official development programs have emerged as an important part of the foreign policies
of most developed nations, although the motives behind their policies have varied widely
and radically. The underlying motivation may involve the donor nation's security,
37
humanitarian attitudes or diplomatic or political gains. During the cold war period,
foreign aid was used effectively by the economically powerful states of the West to keep
38
their ideological allies and to attract neutrals and adversaries. In other instances, it was
utilized as a means of retaliation or reprisal against the target state for its breach of an
39
international norm or agreement such as an unlawful expropriation. In still other
instances, it was applied for a humanitarian purpose-to promote human rights and to
encourage democratic values in the target state.
As might be expected, developing countries do not welcome the intrusion of
performance conditioning or the conditioning of aid on the performance of human rights
^^
C. FRED BERGSTEN & LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 140-141 (1975).
38
For instance, the United States has used aid for many purposes: to solicit support for a particular
diplomatic initiative, to strengthen or weaken a particular government's internal political position and to
change a government's internal and foreign policies. THOMAS L. BREWER, AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 224 (1980).
39
This is a self-remedy which is allowed to force defaulting states into compliance, since it is carried out
in the course of exercising a legal right. These measures were imposed on aid recipients that expropriated
American property and were also used to penalize third world countries like India or Egypt that pursued a
non- alignment policy in international affairs. This remedy was also used against the Philippines, which
voted in constant opposition of the US position in the General Assembly of the United Nations. See Id. at
128.
The United States for example withdrew aid for countries sue as Chile, Guatemala and Haiti on grounds
of human rights. See HUFBAUER, supra note 3, at 359, 417, 438, 598.
Moreover, multilateral instruments such as the Lome Convention upholds the viewpoint that the promotion
of human rights should be an integral part of development and the assistance of the European Union goes
to those states pursuing that objective. See Fourth ACP-EEC Convention and Final Act, Dec. 15, 1989.
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practices. The use of this weapon for human rights purpose is opposed by a number of
countries on the basis of the varying theoretical, legal and political reasons. To put the
issue in a legal perspective, it is important to discuss on the nature and normative status
and issue of universality of human rights.
A brief analysis of the controversy surrounding te issues of the universality of
uman rigts and their normative character may help one to comprehend the importance of
using sanctions to enforce human rights and the need for the importance of this notion.
CHAPTER III
AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Sources of International Law of Human Rights.
The notion of human rights is subject to both national and international legal
regimes, the former being manifested under the constitutional law in the domestic legal
system while the latter exists in a form of international treaties and customs.
Nonetheless, most states fail to comply with both the national and international legal
regimes protecting human rights. Particularly in the international legal order, states fail in
spite of the fact that they have "voluntarily consented to be bound by international
obligations regulating certain standards of human rights. The conceptual basis of human
rights gets even more complicated in the international legal paradigm. States fail to agree
if there could be an international legal regime dealing with human rights. The various
disputes among states on issues of human rights is symbolic in displaying such state of
affairs-mainly to present a positive public image-most states fail to uphold these
commitments in practice.
The basic source of law in the international paradigm is the Charter of the United
Nations, and the greater part of international human rights law is contained in a number
of multilateral human right instruments. The United Nations grew as a central forum for
20
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the development of international human rights law, and it sponsored numerous
multilateral treaties regulating a vast area of human rights. "*' The vaguely worded
provisos of human rights were further elaborated by subsequent international human right
instruments such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'*^ and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights'^l
B. The Controversy Surrounding the Theory of Human Rights:
Universalism Versus Cultural Relativism
The issue of the universality of human rights may be examined from two critically
divided positions. In one category are scholars who propound the idea that human rights
are universal. This universalist position, in turn, in divided into two different
jurisprudential schools of thought, namely the positivist and naturalist approaches.'*'' The
positivist approach emphasizes the normative binding nature of rules created by the
41
The United Nations Human Rights Commission was mandated in 1946 to prepare an international bill of
rights, which was adopted in 1948 by the General Assembly as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed 10 Dec. 1948, GA Res. 217 A(III), UN Dec. A/810, at
71 (1948).
The scope of human rights in the UN Charter is broader and multidimensional in nature. It
endorsed multitude of civil, economic and social and cultural rights. The civil and political rights requires
that all necessary measures be taken to protect the infringement of the rights of individuals bythe state or
by other fellow citizens. Social and economic rights which are also called the obligation to fulfill, require
that states "take the measures necessary to ensure for each person within its jurisdiction opportunities to
obtain satisfaction of those needs, recognized in the human rights instruments, which cannot be secured by
personal effoerts". See Asbjom Eide, National sovereignty and international Efforts to Realize Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE 5 (Eide & Hagtuet, eds., 1992)
42
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar.
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171(1966)
43
International Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 21 Dec. 1965, entered into
force 4 Jan. 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.(1966). See generally SCOTT DAVIDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS 64-
67(1993)
44
Richard Falk, Cultural Foundationsfor the International Protection ofHuman Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44-45 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, ed. 1992).
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various international human rights instruments, to which individual states have
committed themselves. States were directly involved in the formulation and subsequent
adoption of these international standards of human rights and their machinery of
implementation. Naturalists on the other hand view the content of human rights as
being basically laid down in perpetual values having a universal existence, and the
emergence of this concept is attributed to the transformation of modem human thought
about the nature ofjustice.
An opposite position to the two universalist approaches described above is that of
the cultural relativists, who hold that the concept of human rights is recognized only in
the West and does not have a legitimate status in the major cultural traditions of
48
developing nations. The underlying tenet of relativism in human rights practices is that
transterritorial, legal or moral standards have no force or validity in judging whether a
given conduct of a state is right or wrong. These scholars contend that standards of
human rights vary according to the culture of individual states and are necessarily a
reflection of local and domestic "idiosyncracies". They attempt to substantiate this
"^ IdAA.
''id
"^^Z^. at 44-45.
The adherents of this view generally advocate that human rights is not the culture of the west by
rationalizing that western civilization has committed the most barbaric violations on mankind in the world
in the past and, moreover, has been very slow in adopting the concepts of human rights. Id. At 45.
"^^
Id at 45.
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See Abdullahi A. An'im, Towards A Cross-Cultural Approach To Defining International Standards of
Human Rights : The Meaning OfCruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 41 (Abdullahi A. An-
Na'im, ed. 1992).
Falk, supra note 44, at 45.
For instance, Abdullahi An-Na'im analyzes the condemnation of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment in
order to illustrate the need for a cross-cultural approach to defining the concept and the difficulty of
implementing the same. He says that it is unrealistic to expect a uniform application or interpretation of
standards. For example, he notes that a North American may conceive a short term imprisonment to be an
23
contention by comparing the lawfulness of a given conduct in two or more cultures; what
is considered to be a violation of human rights in the West could be a proper act, morally
as well as legally, in another culture. Alternatively, although the culturalists admit that
there exists a body of substantive human rights norms at the international level, they
insist that their meaning and application cannot be uniform and standard, as there is a
substantial variation in different cultures.^' They allege that, like any other normative
rules and principles, the current international standards of human rights have a certain
cultural and philosophical basis and these foundations, as far as human rights are
52
concerned, are attributed initially to western culture. The third world countries, which
are the main protagonists of this idea, say that they have not been strong enough to resist
the philosophical hegemony of the West by articulating their own indigenous ideas and
concepts. These countries point to colonization and its impact of circumscribing the
development of their basic philosophical and practical values.
appropriate sanction for theft, while a Moslem may feel that amputation of the hand is appropriate under a
similar condition. The American would have a feeling that Islamic punishment is 'obviously' cruel and
inhumane and such should not be the norm. A Moslem may think that this view is a reflection of western
ethnocentricity. Apparently, due to such differences, it is not easy to establish a universal standard in a
particular area. See An-na'im, supra note 48, at 37-38.
/c/. at 20-21.
''id.
Yet, the thinking prevalent in many of those developing countries-countries that have not recognized the
universality of human rights and claim to have their own notions-is gradually devolving to a conditional
acceptance of individual rights. In the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, Asian countries revised their stand for
the Vienna Conference in Human Rights; these governments affirmed the universality of human rights but
cautioned that human rights "must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of
international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and the
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds". See Preparatory meeting of the Asian countries in
Bangkok, March 1993, Far E. Econ. Rev. 16 (June 17, 1993).
Similarly, the legal framework for human rights in Africa is contained in the African Charter on Human
and People Rights, a document that gave due weightage to individual rights. Nevertheless, the Preamble of
the Charter expressly stated that "the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for
the enjoyment of civil and political rights". OAU Doc. CAB/ LEG/67/3/ Rev. 5 (1982), PMBL., Par. 8.
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An-na'im, supra note 49,at 22, at39.
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Most scholars in this area hold polar positions on the relevance of cultural values
over human rights, but both views have their own strong arguement. One has to pause for
a careful inquir\' in examining the relevance of cultures. The view that human rights
derives its legitimacy from the diverse cultural traditions of the world falls short of the
practical reality. One need only to realize the disparity between certain human right
standards and the cultural values of some developing countries. On the other hand, it is
important to note the argument, made by the universalist group, that the purpose of
cultural relativism is only an excuse for justifying human rights violations under the
pretext of preserving cultural traditions.
C. The Classification of Rights under International Law
In the previous discussion, we noted that different regions of the world hold
different views about the validity or relevance of human rights. Undoubtedly, this
approach is reflected in practice, for the difference in the understanding about the
existence, significance and relationships of these rights gives birth to its own practical
consequence. Thus, a considerable debate still revolves around the definition and scope
of human rights. The most important ones relate to te relationsip between the different
groups of human rights and te degree of importance between the same. The argument
surrounding the universality of human rights is evident in the classification of different
kinds of human rights into many categories and in the issue of primacy of one category of
rights over another.
There exists an enormous controversy surrounding the juridical nature and the
normative relationship between the so-called generations of rights. One position takes
25
the extreme view that only civil and political rights, which are also known as first
generation rights, should be recognized as human rights in the juridical sense.
^"^
According to this position, second and third generation rights are not rights in the strict
sense in that they cannot be claimed as rights and are only inspirational targets that do not
create a normative obligation. " An opposite view to this argument, on the other hand,
holds that economic and social rights should attain primacy because the realization of the
first generation of rights is somehow dependent upon the realization and the fulfillment of
the second and third generation rights." Consequently, the developing world attaches
more significance to some categories of rights than does the developed world.^^ The
Banjul Charter, for instance, contains provisions on civil and political rights, as well as
provisions on social and economic rights, but the Charter underlines that the enhancement
of economic, social and cultural rights are the "guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and
'^4
For example, Jerome Shestack observes that civil and political rights "deserve a hierarchical preference"
over social and economic rights, because the latter are "contingent claims or expectations', while the
former can be secured by an act of simple omission. See JEROME J. SHESTACK, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGTS, in Human Rigts in International Law 73 (1 Theodore Meron,
ed., 1984). See also T.Van BoVen. Distinguishing Criteriasfor Human Rights , in THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (IVasak, ed., 1982).
Falk, supra note 44, at 45-46.
This controversy was manifested in the process of producing a legally binding instrument fi-om the
principles upheld in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the formulation of the binding
document, one group advocated the adoption of all kinds of rights as legally binding, holding that "all
types of rights constituted an indivisible and mutually self-supporting whole". On the other hand, a group
led by the United States and the United Kingdom propounded that international law could protect only first
generation rights as a matter of immediacy.
This dichotomy resulted in the emergence of two separate legal instruments dealing with two
generations of rights, both adopting different methods of implementation. The International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights under article 2(1) calls for member states to "respect and ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized ". Article 2(1) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights demands that states "undertake to take steps. ..to the
maximum of their available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the ftill realization of the
right recognized". See generally Van Boven, supra note 54, at 4 1
.
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political rights"
,
thus indicating the primacy of the former group of rights over the
latter.
The third category is a middle-of-the-raod approach. It admits that each
generation of rights has a normative existence but makes a hierarchical classification
among the various categories of rights by advocating that some rights are more
fundamental than others. These so-called fundamental rights are referred to as "supra
positive" or "elementary rights" because their validity "is not dependent on their
acceptance by the subjects of the law but [these rights, collectively] are the foundations of
the international community". Certain kinds of rights have been asserted to be
inviolable and non-derogatory, having the characteristics of a jus cogens. The
characterization of certain rights as non-derogatory and their status as "peremptory
norms" are, as the argument runs, "binding on states, even in the absence of any
conventional obligation or any other express acceptance or comment".
These core rights have been incorporated in universal and regional human rights
instruments. The Charter of the United Nations, for instance, refers to some rights as
being fundamental. The Preamble of the Charter clearly mentions that the peoples of the
United Nations are determined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights." This
implies that certain rights acquire a higher status by being fundamental and by having a
<0
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/ Rev. 5 (1987).
59 Van Boven, supra note 54, at 43-44.
A Peremptory norm is defined under article of the Vienna La w of Treaties in the following manner:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character. Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, May 28, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S.331.
61 Van Boven, supra note 54, at 43.
" See U.N. Charter, pmbl.
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prior existence to their recognition under the Charter.^^ These rights are critical to the
preservation of human life, and their enhancement and promotion requires only that the
state abstain from the interference of these rights.^"* The prohibition against acts of
genocide, racial discrimination, extra-judicial killing, torture, inhumane and degrading
treatment, slavery and unlawful or prolonged detention are some examples of core rights
where no derogation is allowed. Despite the varying views that surround the generation
of rights, it is apparent that many nations attach special importance to these core rights.
The paper advocates the universal enforcement of these kind of human rights such as
genocode, slavery, torture, enfoced disappearance, racial discrimination, apartheid, etc.
" See SHESTACK, Supra note 54, at 73..
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These fundamental rights could be distinguished from other human rights in that their validity does not
rest on their acceptance by the "subjects of law" but are considered to be at the foundation of the
international community. See Van Boven, supra note 54, at 58.
^^ /^.at 44-48.
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States lists the following acts as prohibitions
of customary international law: genocide; slavery and slave trade; murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals; torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary
detention; systematic racial discrimination; and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally
recognized rights. See RESTATEMENT (Third) OF FOREGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Sec.702( 1987).
CHAPTER IV
THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF USING
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Economic Sanctions as a Forcible Countermeasures: The General Prohibition of
Forcible Countermeasures Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
Contemporary international law precluded the use of force as a form of reprisal.
The United Nations Charter expressly proscribes the use of force except in self-defense.
As Bowett noted, "Under the United Nations charter, the use of force by way of reprisal
is illegal."
Any attempt to resolve the legality of economic coercion as a means of
countermeasure rests on the meaning one gives to the phrase "use of force" under the
Charter. Whether or not this provision applies exclusively to the use of armed force or
whether it can also be applied to economic coercion-is open to interpretation. The
architects of the Charter left it vague, either with purpose or inadvertantly. The scope of
Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. Int'L. L. 1, 1 (1972).
The prohibition of the threat or use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter is one of the fundamental
principles governing the United Nations and its members. Article 2(4) reads as follows: "All members
shall refrain in their international relation from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United
Nations".
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this prohibition has remained debatable and interpretative. The question of resolving the
legality of economic coercion under the Charter of the United Nations rests on the
meaning of the phrase "use of force" under article 2(4). There are two schools of
thought. One school advocates a wider interpretation in the meaning of the phrase so as
to include economic coercion. Kelsen understood the prohibition of force to mean "any
action of a member State illegal under general international law which is directed against
another state." As one of the leading authors who held that the prohibition of force
transcended physical force, Kelsen further maintained,
A distinction between armed force and other kind of force necessarily
follows from the provision of article 39, 41, 42 and 50, concerning the
measure to be taken by the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security. According to the provisions of article 41
and 42, two kinds of measures are to be distinguished, and according to
article 50, both are to be considered as "enforcement measures": a measure
"not involving the use of armed force" /Art. 41/ and a measure "involving
the use of armed force" /Art. 42/. If there are "enforcement" measures
involving the use of armed force and "enforcement" measures not
involving the use of armed force, armed force that is force exercised by the
use of arms must be distinguished from force exercised in another way,
that is force not exercised by the use or arms. There are two kinds of force
not exercised by the use of arms: (1) an action of a state directed against a
state which constitutes a violation of international law, but which does not
involve the use of arms; (2) a reprisal which does not involve the use of
armed force. Article 2, paragraph 4, refers to the "use of force." It
therefore prohibits both kinds of force.
^^ HANS KELSEN, INTERNATRIONAL LAW STUDIES: COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 57(VOL. 49, 1957).
^^ HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 49
USNWCILS(1957). Also see BELACHEW ASRAT, PROHIBITION OF FORCE UNDER THE UN
CHARTER: A STUDY OF ART. 2(4) 1 16 (199 1).
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A similar interpretation was set forth by McDougal and Feliciano, who contended
that the attitude that the:
employment of non-military types of coercion was never meant to be
prohibited, is subject to serious reservations. The authority of the Security
Council to characterize particular coercion as a "threat to the peace,"
"breach of the peace" or "act of aggression", and to call for appropriate
sanctioning measures is not restricted, by the charter at least, as to the
modality of coercion that may be so characterized.^^
This school grew in influence, especially in the oil boycott of the Arab states
against the West. In contemporary state of international affairs, however, the
developing countries, which seek legal protection from interference by powerful states,
are the chief adherents of this viewpoint. They contend that non-military forms of duress
should be included in the general proscription of use of force, many, if not all, of the
^^ MYRE S S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 1 1-12(1961).
Paust &Blaustein, The Arab oil weapon: A threat to international peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 410, 417
(1973).
In spite of frequent use of economic coercion by the West prior to this event, the oil embargo was
characterized as "blackmail." New York Times, Feb. 7, 1974, 1. Col. 4.]
One critic noted that "the United States itself has been one of the worst offenders in using trade
controls in ways which have adversely affected other countries. As a result of congressional pressures, the
President was given the authority to cut off aid to countries trading with Cuba or North Vietnam..." See
Gardener, The hard road to world order, 52 Foreign Affairs 567 (1974).
Critics also mentioned the "mirror image" principle, which envisages that "the claims one projects
against another will be reflected in similar claims against oneself, a doctrine equally applicable in
international law. Lillich, supra note, at 80.
Some proponents of a wider interpretation of article 2(4) invoked arguments to substantiate
extreme views. Stone, for instance, believes that economic coercion violates article 2(4) of the Charter,
which he thinks protects a sovereignty broader than political independence. See Tom J. Farer, Political and
Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. iNT'L. L. 405, 405 (1985). Few even
think that economic sanction could constitute economic aggression against a sovereign nation. Such
extreme or radical views may deny the exclusive sovereign right of the coercing state to adopt foreign
policy rules that influence other states. During the Arab oil boycott, for instance, many stated that the
United States could have exercised its right of self-defense in response to the "economic aggression"
perpetrated by the oil-producing Arab nations. Id. at 405-407 (discussing the legal consequences of acts of
economic sanction.)
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Western States have become more antagonistic to the view which attempts to proscribe
economic coercion under the Charter of the United Nations. The legal advisor of the US
Department of State expressed the following view in respect to the status of economic
coercion under international law, particularly under the Charter:
[T]he charter of the United Nations contains a number of very important
and far-reaching restrictions on the use of armed force, but it says nothing
at all about restrictions on the use of economic measures of coercion by
individual states or group of states. Conceivably, economic measures
could give rise to a dispute, the convenience of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, within the meaning of
article 33 of the charter, but even that is nowhere made clear. Economic
pressure may be unfriendly and even unfair, but economic coercion, per
se, cannot generally be said to be prohibited by the UN charter.
The apparent ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase merit te examination of the
records of the drafting of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco.
1. Draft History of the Charter.
Resort to the records(travaux preparatoires) is indispensable, given the failure to
achieve a definitive interpretation in this area. This recourse to the legislative materials
and deliberations can help to ascertain the legislative intent of the drafters of the Charter.
Brazil made the following amendment proposal to the original Dumbarton Oaks
draft article of article 2(4): "All members of the organization shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use offorce and from the threat and use of
11
economic measures in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization."
(emphasis supplied)
^'
Digest USDIL (1976) at 577.
See also OMAR ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-ENFORCIBLE MEASURES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 203(1988).
Summary report of the 1 1th meeting of the committee, I/I, Doc. 784 I/I 27, June 5, 1945, Documents of
the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. IV, 331, at 334.
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The circumstances surrounding the actual passage of the provision disclose that
the phrase was conceived to include the use of economic coercion. To this proposal, the
delegate of the United States remarked that "the intention of the authors of the original
text was to state in the broadest terms 'an absolute, all inclusive prohibition.' and the
phrase, 'in any other manner' was designed to ensure that there should be no
loopholes." Concurring with the United States, the Belgian delegate noted that the
Brazilian delegation "had underestimated the effect of the modification made in the
original text, calling attention, particularly to the phrase 'in any other manner.' "
Although the Brazilian amendment proposal was defeated, its defeat could not be
traced to a reluctance among member states to exclude the notion of economic coercion
from the definition of the "use of force." Rather, the idea of economic coercion was
omitted because it was already included in the term, "in any manner." This indicates that
a broad meaning of the word "force" was intended by the member states and no one
opposed to such an interpretation in principle. The Brazilian amendment was not thus
rejected with the clear intention of confining the prohibition to armed force.
2. Authentic Interpretation of the Charter by the General Assembly
In general, the practice of individual states does not equate the use of economic
coercion with armed aggression; moreover, a distinct trend to restrict a nation's use of
economic and political measures can be seen. In the practice of the United Nations, this
trend is supportive of a wider meaning of force in that its meaning is generally "taken as
Id.San Francisco document, at 335.
''id
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bearing something more than armed force. "''^ The legal duty against the use of economic
coercion finds a justification under the General Assembly resolution which prohibits the
use of economic sanction either as a use of force or contrary to the principle of non-
intervention. The General Assembly dealt with the matter in certain of its declarations.
The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty
condemned not only the resort to armed intervention but also "all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state against its political,
economic and cultural elements." Most important of all is the General Assembly's
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation in which it was proclaimed that "[N]o state may use or encourage the use of
economical, political or any other type of measure to coerce another state in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from
77
it advantages of any kind."
A closer look strongly reveals that the Declaration favors a broader interpretation
78
of the content that economic coercion constitute an act of breach of international law.
For instance, the ninth preambular paragraph of the annex of the Declaration sets forth,
"the duty of states to refrain in their international relations from military, political,
economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or
territorial integrity of any state."^^ According to this statement, the references to armed
^^ See ASRAT, supra note 68, at 1 17.
This resolution was adopted by a vote of 109 in favor and one abstention as General Assembly
Resolution 2131 (XX) of December 2 1 , 1 965
.
^^G.A. Resolution 2625(XXV), 24 Dec. \91Q,UNGA0R, 25th Sess., Supp.28(A/8028), 1970, at 121.
78
See ASRART, supra note 68, at. 1 1 7.
''id.
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force and other forms of coercion are undifferentiated as to their legal character or
consequence when applied to the protected rights of states, reflecting the concept that the
prohibition of force covers other forms of economic and political coercion in addition to
armed force.
In his discussion of the nature of the Declaration's support of a broader view of
the content of prohibited force, Obradivic wrote,
Both of these provisions [the ninth preambular paragraph and the second
paragraph of non-intervention] have been combined with the principle of
the non-use of force, particularly with the general formulation of the
prohibition under paragraph 1 of the principle, and clearly show that there
are no grounds whatever for the concept of force in the Declaration to be
interpreted as applicable only to armed force.
These statements indicate that the concept of force is understood to include
economic coercion. This interpretation by the member states stands as an authentic
interpretation of the Charter, a politico-legal instrument whose creation is attributed to the
consent of the international community of states and whose function is mainly to regulate
the behavior of the states that created it. Therefore, the Declaraation of the general
assembly prohibiting the use of economic coercion stands as one body of law regulating
the application of economic sanction.
^°/c/.atll8.
*'
K. OBRADOVIC, PROHIBITION OF USE OF FORCE, in Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation 88 (M. Sahovic, ed., 1972)
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C. Understanding by the International Law CommissionaLC;)
The International Law Commission(ILC) has also taken a stand, though not a
firm one ,in this controversy surrounding the meaning of use of force. The draft articles
of the ILC on the Law of Treaties, which subsequently resulted in the creation of the
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968 and 1969, included a provision
dealing with the effect of the use of force in the conclusion of the treaties. The final
adoption by the Convention on the Law of Treaties read thus under article 52: "A treaty is
devoid if its conclusions have been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of
the principle of international law embodied in the charter of the United Nations."
Since the ILC could not obtain a consensus on the meaning of the use of force,
especially when it contained pressures of an economic or political nature, it opted to
leave its interpretation open, as follows:
Any interpretation of the principle that states are under an obligation to
refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the
charter, which becomes generally accepted as authoritative, will
automatically have its effect on the scope of the rule handed down in the
present article.
Although attempts by some members to write an amendment
providing for a clear prohibition of economic and political pressure innthe
breach of treaty law failed, an agreement was finally reached to include a
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.52, 1155 UNTS 331.
0-1
See generally G. ARANGIO-RUIZ , THE U.N. DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-25 (1979).
^"^ (1966) 2 YB Int'l L. Comm'n, sec.5, 1966.
85
In its commentary on the provision, the ILC reported that "some members of the Commission expressed
the view that any other forms of pressure, such as a threat to strangle the economy of a country, ought to be
stated in the article as falling within the concept of coercion." The Commission, however, decided to
define coercion in terms of a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter,'2s. and
considered that the precise scope of the acts covered by this definition should be left to be determined in
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declaration to accompany article 52 of the Convention. This declaration,
which was voted for 102-0-4, forms an integral part of the Conference. ^^
The declaration reads as follows:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Upholding the principle that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed in good faith,
Reaffirming the Principle of the sovereign equality of states,
Convinced that states must have complete freedom in performing an act
relating to the conclusion of a treaty.
Deploring the fact that in the past states have sometimes been forced to
conclude treaties under pressure exerted in various forms by other states.
Desiring to ensure that in the future no such pressure will be exerted in any
form by any state in connection with the conclusion of a treaty,
1. Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form,
whether military, political, or economic, by any state in order to coerce
another state to perform any act relating to the conclusion treaty in
violation of the Principles of the sovereign equality of states and freedom
of consent,
2. Decides that the present Declaration shall form part of the Final Act
of the Conference on the Law of Treaties.
By virtue of this Declaration, the intention of the International Law Commission
to single out the use of economic coercion as a ground of invalidating the effectiveness of
a treaty or as a cause of undermining the binding nature of the treaty between states was
vividly stated.
The prohibition of economic coercion as a means of countermeasure is to be
determined by the extreme nature of the measure taken in terms of the seriousness of the
potential consequences threatening the "territorial integrity or political independence" of
on
the state concerned. By so incorporating the latter phrase from the wording of article
practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter. See Id. at 256.
See LTN Doc.A/Conf. 39/c.l/L.323, UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, Official
Records, 101, Sec. 13: Documents of the Conference, 173 and 85.
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Report ofthe Commission on the Work of its 47th Session ( Official Record of the General Assembly,
37
2(4), the ILC admitted that both forcible and non-forcible measures have a similarly
oo
relevant effect. This approach purposely avoided the controversy revolving around the
meaning of the use of force or other forms of coercive acts,^^ yet it offered a meaningful
and practical resolution to the problem. The ILC was aware that the broad formulation
prohibiting economic and political coercion would be a total-prohibition of
countermeasure, and it therefore limited the prohibition of such conduct only to extreme
economic or political coercion. The draft article of the ILC, the commentaries thereof,
and the reports of the special rapporteur are very relevant indications about the
development of the law in this respect. In addition to being the work of known
publicists, they also "constitute a stage in the UN work of codification and progressive
development of international law..."
It can amply be observed that the use of the word "force" is distinct from the
usage of "armed forces" in the Charter. The terms are used differently in the various
provisions of the Charter. The word "force" is applied in some provisions without
qualifications under articles 41, 42, 43, and 46, while the qualifying word "armed" was
used elsewhere, whenever this meaning was intended. The exclusion and/or omission
50th Session, Supp No. 10(A/50/10) at 149-173.
See Id.
on
ASRAT, supra note 68, 18-19.
^°
Id. at 19.
^' THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 137(1989).
Brownlie noted the sources as being "analogous to the writings of publicist, and at least as
authoritative, are the draft articles produced by the international law commission..." BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (3rd. ed. 1979).
^^
Id. at 130.
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For example, article 41 of the Charter read that " The Security council may decide what measures not
involving the use of amed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
members of the United Nations to apply these measures...."
94
See for example article 45 of the Charter.
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of the phrase "armed force" could be construed as being demonstative of the awareness of
the drafters to make such a distinction. Whenever they wanted to designate armed forces,
the drafters wTOte expHcitly without leaving any room for ambiguity. Furthermore, a
close reading of the text of the United Nations Charter favors a wider interpretation to the
meaning of the phrase "use of force." For instance, it can be argued that the enforcement
mechanism by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter also envisages
measures "not involving the use of armed force," such as ruptures of economic relations.
The Security Council may resort to this enforcement measure under Chapter VII in
limited situations involving the threat to the maintenance of international peace and
security, as provided under article 39. Although one might argue that the drafters did not
desire to encourage the use of economic measures under normal circumstances, the
subsequent practice of states does not tend to support this view.
Attempts to resolve the issue of illegality of economic coercion in respect to the
broader meaning of the "use of force" as manifested under UN Charter article 2(4) and in
the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations may seem to be inconsistent with
contemporary and past practice. Even assuming that the black letter law in the Charter
included the use of economic force in the generic meaning of the word "force"did not
seem to change the practice, nor did it even mold it to a certain extent to that effect.
Moreover, the classification of economic sanction as being under the category of force
would completely outlaw the use of economic sanctions in international relations.95
Generally speaking, the use of forcible counter-measures is prohibited under international
law except in self-defense.
95 The Charter of the United Nations allows the use of armed reprisal or countermeasure only in cases of
self-defense and outlaws the use of force as a tool for enforcing the legal obligation of another state.
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If "use of force" is defined broadly and includes economic sanction, then the
imposition of sanction becomes illegal per se as a means of coercing another state to
comply with its legal obligations. The use of economic sanction is admissible in
circumstances involving self-defense. Thus, a state is justified in employing a unilateral
measure of self-defense against the use of physical force by another state, an act which
would otherwise have been illegal under article 2(4) of the Charter. Similarly, economic
sanctions can be carried out and can be justified under international law only as a means
of self-defense against an act of aggression by another state.
For all practical purposes, the legal duty against the use of economic coercion
finds a better justification under the principle of non-intervention than under article 2(4)
of the Charter. The latter provision, at least in practice, pertains to a more blatant
violation under international law, namely the use of physical force. It is therefore safe to
conclude that the proscription of the conduct withheld under the 1970 Declaration
pertains only to economic measures which are unlawful and interventionist in nature.
However, when an illegal act precedes the economic coercion, the coercing state has the
legal power to use economic coercion to restrain the conduct of the target state. In such
cases, the normative validity of such an act may not be subjected to any challenge under
international law, and the measure does not breach the principle formulated in the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations.
Moreover, the Declaration does not prohibit the overall imposition of economic
sanction in international relations; what it does prohibit is the use of economic coercion
meant either to secure advantages of any kind or to subordinate another state's right to
exercise the sovereign power of a state. When sanctions are imposed to coerce a
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defaulting state to comply with its legal obligations, the argument that the sanctions
comprise a restriction on the state's sovereign right is invalid.
It is plain that the present and past operation of the law and the practice of states
do not support the view that economic coercive measures are considered to be the use of
force. Since there dooes not exist a practice supporting the view that use of force includes
economic coercions, then the arguement along this line fall short of any practical
significance. In addition to this, the expansive reading of "use of force" under the Charter
would restrict the use of economic countermeasures. According to such this view, the
enforcement of human rights utilizing economic sanction would thus be unlawful per se
as a consequence of the prohibition of forceful reprisal. Therefore, an attempt to
invalidate the utilization of economic sanctions as tools for enforcing human rights by
virtue of calssifying it as a "use of forcce" would wrong at once.
The following chapter will discuss the use of unilateral economic sanction to
induce the target to comply with a certain human right norm or to coerce the same to alter
its policies. This type of action, as will be demonstrated, is contrary to some of the
principles recognized under international law, namely that of non-intervention and the
rules pertaining to the taking of countermeasures.
B. Economic Sanctions As Non-Forcible counterMeasures.
I. Act of Retorsion: The Sovereign Right of States.
While examining the legality of economic sanctions, one must distinguish
between acts of economic coercion which are reprisals from those that are mere
retorsions. Whereas retorsion is defined as an unfriendly but a lawful act which may be
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taken by an aggrieved party against a wrongdoer^^, economic measures may categorized
as a reprisal when "it is directed against a state which has previously performed an illegal
act." Retorsion can also be applied in response to an unfriendly though not unlawful act
of another state and where there is no legal obligation that the enforcer is committed to
go
perform towards the target, as opposed to reprisals, which are exclusively "directed
against a state which has previously performed an illegal act." Therefore, unlike other
self-help mechanisms, retorsion can be carried out by a state regardless of whether a prior
violation of a legal obligation had existed or not.
Many states have resorted to the use of retorsion for unilateral enforcement of
international law through the instrumentality of their own municipal laws. The United
States, for instance, has abundantly utilized retortive measures to induce compliance with
international law and to protect its interests using its domestic laws. In the Battle Act,
the United States called for an embargo on shipments of goods to countries of destination
102
that endangered its national security, mainly the USSR and its satellites. In addition,
the Foreign Assistance Act provided for the withdrawal of military aid to countries
engaged in systematic and crude violations of internationally recognized human rights.
^^ ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANAYLSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES 5 (1984).
^^ PIETER JAN KUYPER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, in
Legal issues in international Trade 148 (Peter Sarcevic & Han Van Houtte, eds.)
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ZOLLER, Supra note 96,at 5.
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SCOTT DAVIDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS 148 (1993)
ZOLLER. supra note 96, at 7.
Retorsion through municipal legislation does not need to be legitimatized in a strictly legal sense, because
there is no principle under international law that obligates state A to export its strategic goods to state B or
to grant it foreign aid. Id. at 8.
101,, „
Id. ax 8.
'°^U.S.C. ss 1611 b/d.
'^^
Section 502 B, a(2) SS 2394(Suppl. Ill, 1979).
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The right to acts of retorsion emanates from the sovereign right of states. The
power of states to regulate their own affairs, including the withdrawal of foreign aid, may
be categorically defined as the sovereign attributes of states. The principle of sovereignty
is a rule of international law guaranteeing states with the exclusive right to regulate their
internal and external matters and foreign relations in any way they want without
interference from another entity. This shows the doctrinal muddle inherent in the
concept of sovereignty. The paradox arising out of the scope of the exercise of this right
is difficult to define, for its absolute exercise will have a direct indirect ramification on
the exercise of the same right by another state. Buchheit demonstrated the paradox of the
whole concept of sovereignty in the following statement:
The notion of sovereignty is at best a metaphysical concept describing a
situation in which no nation has ever found itself The mere existence of
other nations implies at least a minimal constraint in the freedom of any
particular state. In a multinational world, any member state must consider
the feeling of its neighbors before taking action that affects them. To the
extent that it must so it is not free, and to the extent that such state in not
free, it is not truly sovereign. But to say that there are practical constraints
upon a nation's freedom of action is a far different thing from saying that
there are legal, or perhaps even moral restriction on its freedom. The
proposition that the principles of international law exist independently of
the respect given to them by individual nations is at best arguable and
probably unsupported by the history of international behavior.
Although a state has the exclusive authority to regulate matters pertaining to its
own sovereignty, the exercise of the same right by other states impedes the unlimited
exercise of the same. Thus the power of the state to exercise its rights is limited to the
'"'*
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1990).
See LEE C. Buchheit, 77?^ Use ofNon Violent coercion: A study in the Legality under Article 2(4) of
the Charter ofthe United Nations, in ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (Richard Lillich, ed.,1976).
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extent that it cannot breach its international legal obligations '°^ and must respect the
sovereignty of other states.
The right to act of retorsion flows from this abstract, "natural" right of states and
is not, generally speaking, regulated under international law. For example, a retortive act
through economic measures is not unlawful per se because trade or other economic
relations between states are not required by law and are only matters of practice. '°^
Hence, to cut off normal trade relations and/or other economic benefits from a state which
does not comply to its international obligation may be a permissive act under the law of
nations but only to the extent that it would not render the exercise of the sovereignty by
other states impossible. It is important to draw the line where one's exercise of a
sovereign right passes the limit and intervenes in the exercise of the sovereign right of
another state. Although the right of retorsion is not governed by international law as
such, it is not, however, insignificant to international law-at least, its effects are not
insignificant.
2. The Rule Against Intervening in the Affairs of Other States: Constraint on the Right of
Retorsion
A corollary to the doctrine of state sovereignty is the principle of non-intervention, which
is a necessary product and effect of the first principle. The exclusive sovereign
Still, the fact of being bound by international obligation find its impetus under the sovereignty of states,
the consent of which can only create, shape, define and determine the existence of international law itself.
See DAVIDSON, supra note 99, at 47-48.
See generally Kuyper, supra note 97, at 49-53.
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See DAVIDSON, supra note 99, at 48.
In the SS Case, the Permanent Court of Justice articulated the existence of the right against non-
intervention in the following way: "The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
state, is that-failing the existence of a permanent rule to the contrary^'it may not exercise its power in any
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jurisdiction over one state's internal affairs would naturally deprive other states from
intervening in those affairs. Conversely, whereas a state's sovereignty bestows upon
itself the exclusive power to regulate its internal and external affairs, its exercise of
sovereignty is not absolute in that it cannot make policy determinations in the internal
matters of another state.
The legal definition of intervention has, however, been controversial due to the
elastic nature of the meaning of the word. Many have defined it in an essentially similar
ways, though as incorporating various scopes. Most agree that it does not mean
meddling, for this interpretation would even classify the issuance of any statement of a
state concerning the pursuit of domestic policy of another state as an act of
interference. Davidson defines interference as "an attempt by one state to perform
state-like functions within the territory of another." Likewise, De Lima define the
essence of intervention as involving a state of affairs in which one state aims to compel
another state to do or to refrain fi-om doing something, "which, left to itself, it would not
do." The intervention could take place either through the use of armed force or
through economic coercion, but what really matters in the distinction between
1 1
1
intervention and interference is the coercive nature or the threat used thereof.
Therefore, issuance of any statement of condemnation or any unfi-iendly act towards
another state that does not amount to a compulsive coercive act, is interference and not
form in the territory of another state." See S.S Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., (1927) Ser. A, No. 9, at. 18.
'°^ DAVIDSON, supra note 99, at 48. Also See ZOLLER, Supra note 96, at 7
'''id
'"Mat 48.
"^5ee F.X. DE LIMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A REFERENCE TO THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 15-16 (1971).
"^
/^. atl6.
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intervention.
The generally unregulated right of retorsion has to be examined with the principle
of non-intervention in mind. The prohibition against non-intervention is basically a
principle under customary international law, and hence does not have many conventional
codified sources. If there is any significant effort or attempt in this direction, the matter is
examined under the various declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly. The
General Assembly of the United Nations has allotted a significant amount of its labor and
time to adopting a variety of resolutions in the area.
3. Declaration of Principles of International Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
This Declaration of Principles, which was unanimously adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations as Resolution 2625 (XXV) in October 1970, embodies a
number of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation,
now constituting "a ver>' important substantial and important corpus of prescriptions."
At present, the definition, provided under the 1 970 Declaration, is generally accepted as
an authentic and a "precise statement of the rule of non-intervention under customary
international law." It defines the principle as follows:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other
state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference
'''id
"^ G. ARANGIO-RUIZ , THE U.N. DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE
SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1979).
The incorporated principles are: (a) the principle that states shall refrain in their international relation from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations; (b) the principle that states shall settle
their international matters so that peace and security and justice are not endangered; the duty not to
intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state in accordance with the charter; (d) the
dut>' of states to co-operate with one another in accordance with the charter; (e) the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples; (f) the principle of sovereign equality of states; and (g) the principle that
states shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the charter of the
United Nations. This declaration was marked as an instrument designed to ensure the peaceful coexistence
among states founded upon varying political, economic social and cultural backgrounds. Id. at 3.
"^ Nicaragua (Nicar.v. U.S.) (merit) 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 109-110.
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or attempted threats against the personaHty of the state or against its
poHtical, economic and cuhural elements are in violation of international
law.
This Declaration sets forth "the duty of states to refrain in their international
relations from military, political, economic and any otherform ofcoercion aimed against
the political independence or territorial integrity ofany state " and describes their use as
being in violation of international law. (emphasis supplied) The third principle in the
Declaration addresses the case of economic coercive measures in its second paragraph:
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind.
4. The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
Article 1 of Chapter 1 1 of this Charter stipulates in general terms the prohibition
of economic coercion and the right of freedom of states against economic coercion. It
declares, "Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic
system in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or
threat in any form whatsoever."
"^ G.A. Resolution 2625(XXV), 24 Dec. \970,UNGAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.28(A/8028), 1970, at 12.
^^^SeeG.A. Res. 2625, 25 UNGAOR, Supp. No.28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
The Declaration lists the "duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in
accordance with the charter" as its third principle. This principle of non-intervention was contained in the
following statement: "[N]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measure to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind." See G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UNGAOR, Supp. 28, p. 121,
UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
^^^See G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th sess., Supp. No. 31, at 52.
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Article 7 has attempted to elaborate on this principle by asserting the "right of a
state to choose its own path of development and utilize its own economic resource and
create the corollary obligation on other states to remove the obstacles hindering the full
12
1
exercise of that right." Also important is article 17, which stresses that economic
assistance to developing countries should be "consistent with their development needs
and objectives, with strict respect for the sovereign equality of the states and free of any
conditions derogating from their sovereignty."
The legal effect of these instruments of the General Assembly, including those
already mentioned, has itself been debated among many scholars. Their opinions have
varied widely. For example, Brower and Tepe undermine the effect of these provisions by
simply attaching a political flavor by saying that "there is not sufficient reciprocity of
interest to persuade the developed states to be legally bound by all the terms of the
charter." Nonetheless, it does not seem to be as simple as stated. What is fundamental
to the understanding of the development of a codified norm regulating non-intervention is
the place of the General Assembly Resolutions in the sphere of international law.
5. Effect of General Assembly Resolutions
Generally speaking, the legal status of resolutions has been controversial; they
have been regarded as being only recommendations or as being declarations of existing
binding rules. The United States and some other nations do not attribute any legal effect
'^'
Id.
122
Id.aiSA.
123
See Brower & Tepe, The Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties ofstates: A Reflection or Rejection of
International Law? 9 International Lawyer (1975).
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to General Assembly resolutions and regard them merely as "statements of political
aspiration" or as statements that depict the expectations of the world community. On
the contrary, others consider them to be authentic and authoritative interpretations of the
provisions of the United Nations Charter by the body which is most representative of the
world community. """ Still others attribute a legal character to General Assembly
resolutions by asserting that some resolutions are proofs of the existence of state practice,
providing strong evidence on the crystallization of state practice and being the final
evolvement of the issue to customary international law. Few of these exponents also
embrace the notion of the instant creation of custom whose constituent element is only
.
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opmion juris.
Between the two extreme doctrinal positions that the General Assembly has a
legislative and a quasi-legislative power and the opposite view that resolutions of the
General Assembly are of no legal vail-is a middle ground. The middle position sees a
General Assembly resolution as having a partial effect, depending on whether it is a
declaration or merely a recommendation. Recommendations of the General Assembly are
understood as having no effect or a minor effect, while declarations produce a legal effect
to the extent that they are assertions of existing general international law or are
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interpretations of the Charter. And yet another view recognizes the General
Assembly's quasi-legislative role as opposed to its law making power. Casteneda says
'^'^
See DAVIDSON, supra note 99, at 57.
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Id. at 57.
'^^ KAMAL HOSSAIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
124(1980).
127
Id. ax 99.
See BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION IN A
CHANGING WORLD 44-45 (1991).
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that the General Assembly does not have the power to create law but its resolutions may
"authoritatively prove its existence".
However, such declaratory power was not vested to the General Assembly
through the Charter. Its foundation could be attributed either to the universal
representation of the General Assembly or to its development through years of
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practice. The power of the General Assembly has not been persistently challenged by
any state. As Professor Schachter wrote.
In the last few years, we have witnessed an increasing insistence on the
authoritative character of General Assembly Resolutions on intervention,
self-determination, territorial occupation, human rights, sharing of
resources and foreign investment. They purport to "declare the law,- either
in general terms or as applied to a particular case. Neither in form nor
intent are they recommendatory. Surprising as it may seen, the authority of
the General Assembly to adopt such declaratory resolutions was accepted
from the very beginning.
Declarations of the General Assembly are said to express the "intent to declare
law, whether customary, general principle, or instant, spontaneous or new law, and when
they are adopted by a unanimous or nearly unanimous vote, or by consensus, there is a
presumption that the rules and principles adopted in the declaration are law."
Moreover, article 13(l)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the Assembly
no
CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS(1969)).
See also FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING,
336 (2nd ed. 1993]CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS(1969)).
'^° SLOAN, supra note 128, at 46.
'''
Id.
SLOAN, supra note 128, at 45 {quoting, Oscar Shachter, The Crisis ofLegitimization in the United
Nation, Alf Ross Memorial Lecture, Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret, Vol. 50 (1981) at 3-4.
'^^/cy.at 151.
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to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting and encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification. For example, while adopting
resolution 2625, the General Assembly's intent to operate within the scope of article
13(l)(a) was reflected under the seventeenth preambular paragraph of the resolution
itself, which read in part,
...the adoption of the declaration on principles of international law
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance
with the charter of the United Nations...would contribute to the
strengthening of world peace and constitute a landmark in the
development of international law and relations among states. ..the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant
contribution to contemporary international law.
Consequently, one can conclude that the Declaration on Friendly Relations is not
simply a venture without normative effect and validity. The prohibition of the use of
economic coercion, incorporated in the Declaration, has, therefore, a legal effect of its
own upon the members. The difficult task is to identify those acts of a state which pose a
threat to the political independence or subordinate the sovereign right of other states.
6 Ground for Determining Intervention Based on an Objective Test
In deciding if an economic sanction is legally permissible by virtue of being an
act of retorsion or impermissible by virtue of being in violation of the rule against non-
intervention, one must examine two key factors: the motive behind the economic sanction
and its effect. The intention of a certain economic conduct, rather than its outcome, is
the deciding factor in determining whether the conduct affects another or not.
'^^ See G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UNGAOR, Supp. No.28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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51
In order to give a reasonable meaning to the formulation of the legal obligation
contained in the 1970 Declaration, Bowett proposed that the English law on the tort of
economic conspiracy be used as a means of testing the unlawful nature of economic
coercion. He wrote:
...the tort of conspiracy evolved to cover a situation in which two or more
persons conspire to commit acts which are lawful per se, but are motivated
by the desire to injure the economic interest of the plaintiff rather than to
protect the interest of the defendants. Such an emphasis upon predominant
purpose would probably provide a more effective criterion for defining
illegal economic coercion then the notions of "subordination of sovereign
rights" or "securing advantages" used in the General Assembly
Resolution.
As compared to the general prohibition of use of force, the "prohibition against
economic or political coercion is limited to those measures that are aimed for
unacceptable ends such as the subordination of the exercise of the sovereign rights of the
target state or securing advantages of any kind." Consequently, not all kinds of
economic coercions are prohibited. For instance, economic measures undertaken by a
state to protect its competitive economic advantage are acceptable acts of retorsion
because protecting one's competitive advantage is seen as inherent in the idea that one's
prosperity is brought about at the expense of another's. Apparently, a state's sovereign
right to regulate its economic relations is perceived from this perspective. On the other
hand, if the measure is targeted against "the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN," it is
illegitimate or an abuse of power. Of course, one cannot assert that state A should sell a
needed item to state B. Nor can one maintain that state A must buy state B's products.
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Bowett, supra note 1 36,at 69.
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SeeBuchheit, supra note 105, at 68.
/^.at68.
141 1
See Parry, Defining Economic Coercion in International Law, 12 Tex.INT L L.J. 4 (1977).
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However, the abrupt termination or interference with an estabhshed trade pattern may
not be permitted if the action causes political or other unreasonable repercussions that are
tantamount to being an act of interference. Therefore, it can be considered that the right of
retorsion may violate international law due to its improper motive, undesirable effect and
disproportional character.
'''^
The commonly reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction, which is guarded by the
principle of sovereignty entails, as its corollary, the non-intervention in the affairs of
other states. The sovereignty of a state does not justify its commission of an unlimited
act of retorsion which leads to an abuse of rights and which may negatively impact the
political independence and sovereignty of other states. The right to resort to an act of
retortion is neither unlimited nor is it incognizant of the rights of other states. Any
attempt to justify unilateral economic coercion as an absolute, unlimited right of states to
acts of retorsion is wrong. This does not however mean that the test would apply to
economic sanctions which are meant neither to further political or economic interests but
rather to coerce another state to comply with its legal obligations.
Let's see the conceptual nature of this approach as applied to human rights.
''^^
Jonathan I. Chamey, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. J. Int'L L. 57, 60, (1989).(
citing the Declaration of Principle of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operations
among States, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.GA.OR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/ 8028 (1980)
which provides that: "No states may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
right and to secure from it advantages of any kind")
Also see Oscar Schachter, International law in theory andpractice, 178 Rec. des Cours 175, 185-87 (v-
1982) , expressing the view that the theory of abuse of right may be relevant in the regard.
Also see Zoller, supra note 96, at 9 , stating that retorsion lies in the "grey zone law and non-law."
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For a similar statement, see Omer Y. Elagab, The Legitimacy ofEconomic Coercion, Development and
peace: A Semi-anna! Journal Devoted to Economic, Political and Social Aspect of Development 62-63
(Vol.5., 1984).
53
7 The Principle Against Inten^ention and Human Rights
More often than not, the issue of non-intervention comes to the forefront in the
discussion of human rights. The principle against intervention and that of the notion of
human rights are meant to protect different interests. The laws pertaining to human rights
are meant to protect individuals from acts of their own government, while the principle
agamst non-mtervention is meant to protect states from interference from other states.
It is of high importance therefore if human rights fall under the domestic jurisdiction of a
state or is an area of international concern. One of the two classifications determine if
human rights situation in a given country is guarded by the doctrine of non-intervention
or not. Moreover, unlike other commitments of states which require absolute compliance
with international obligations once consent is obtained, the situation of human rights
instruments fall under special category. ' Their enforcement therefore rests on the
voluntary trend of compliance of the state themselves. Had it not been for this,
governments would not have reason to accede to instruments which they would have no
"perceived interest". Such lack of enforcement as a result gives rise to a situation
where states subscribe to the norms of human rights without having the slightest intention
to be bound by the same.
Incorporated in the concept of non-intervention is a subconcept of domestic
jurisdiction, which demarcates the line between matters of domestic law and international
''*'' DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS 85
(1994).
'"'^
Richard A. Falk, Theoretical Foundations ofHuman Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 29 ( Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston, eds., 1989).
'^^5e.ld.
'''id.
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law. The two systems of jurisprudence have a direct effect on each other; the
prevalence of one leads to the erosion of the other. The line between these two is not
easy to draw. The boundary drawn at a certain point reflects "the line of permissible
intervention in states." With this boundary in mind, one must decide whether a case
involves the treatment of a state of its own nationals, which is under its domestic
jurisdiction and hence protected by the rule against non-intervention, or whether the
matter involves an area of international concern where the principle of domestic
jurisdiction ceases to apply.
The matter was indirectly addressed in the 1970 Declaration of the General
Assembly which prohibits the use of economic coercion when it is used either to secure
advantages of any kind or to subordinate the rights of another state on Friendly Relations.
Although no direct reference was made to human rights, the latter objective evidently
relates to coercion on a state that impacts its political independence-its right to regulate
its own domestic affairs-including the treatment of its own nationals. The matter in
which a state treats its own subject has naturally been one of the typical attributes of
state's sovereignty. For that matter, the Declaration of the General Assembly in the
sphere of the principle of non-intervention was dictated by the motive of setting up a
legal regime protecting states from such intervention mostly in cases of alleged human
rights violations. Therefore, the act of enforcing human rights in a given state through the
use of a retortive economic act contravenes the general principle of international law
relating to intervention and sovereignty.
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The summary records of the sixth committee of the General Assembly, which was
responsible for the provision on non-interference in this Declaration, reveals the
emergence of two schools of thinking in reference to the relationship between non-
intervention and human rights.'^' Some delegates asserted that the principle of
nonintervention "could not be construed to mean that a country could violate the
fundamental human rights of its citizens without that violation becoming the concern of
152
the entire world community." The momentum however, grew in the direction of the
thinking that particularly emphasized certain categories of human rights violations which
essentially transcend the scope of domestic jurisdiction. Such violations include denial of
the right to self-determination, genocide, apartheid and actions that endanger international
1 53
peace and security. Upholding such a contention will obviously amount to denying
,
both as a matter of law and fact, the premise that states do not have a discretion to take
any measure to the effect of enforcing human rights not having the above characteristics
The principle of non-intervention, having its basis in the protection of states from
the interference of hegemonic states, should not be easily eroded at the discretion of
every state, even at the cost of protecting human rights because the observance of the
principle of sovereignty and the rule against non-intervention form the basis of the law
and order, the non or/and loose regulation of which endangers the regime in which
international law is purported to protect.
'^' MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 77(1992).
'^^
Mr. Brewer (Liberia), November 17, 1967, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1001, para. 2.
'^^
Mr. Okony (Nigeria), November 12, 1962, UN Doc. A/c.6/sr.757, par. 1.)
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See EIDE, supra note 40, at 3-5.
Id at 5. This was what was reflected in the 1986 holding of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case where the
court held that Nicaragua has the right to choose its political and economic path without external
intervention or any act of coersion from an external force.
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Nonetheless, it should not be conceived under any circumstances that the normal
conduct of economic activity with a state that has breached its human rights obligations
amounts to the approval of such infringements by other states. ' Rather, it means that
that states should use international forums to challenge the non-observance of norms of
human rights by the defaulting state. This will be discussed at a latter section of the
paper covering the area of collective sanctioning.
C. Unilateral Economic Sanctions as Reprisal Countermeasures
The discussion on countermeasures will be limited only to reprisals that are
strictly regulated under international law and does not include retorsion which has already
been discussed. To begin with, the terms "legitimate counter-measure" and "sanction"
158
are interchangeably used in the context of this paper. Consequently, a reference to
countermeasure is understood as excluding acts of retorsion and we shall focus only on
reprisals which are interchangeably designated as countermeasures.
The normal conduct of economic activity with Cuba does not necessarily amount to the approval of
Cuba's internal policies, not do they move the right of the United States to challenge Cuba's international
policies at the appropriate international forum, as the case may be, in the event of violation of norms of
human rights. See generally Michael Krisky and David Golove (eds.), United States Economic Measure
Against Cuba 20-25(1993).
The US embargo against Cuba is not challenged only in terms of the sovereign rights of other countries
but in the degree of magenalization that the United States has sustained convening its Cuba policy. Id.at 21.
'"5eeld.
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International Law Commission opted to replace its use of the word "sanction" with "countermeasure" in
the draft articles on state responsibility because the notion of sanction designated a "punitive consequence."
(1979) 2 YB Int'L L. Comm'n, Part II, at 115-1 16.
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1. Non-forcible Countermeasures and Their Legality under International Law
The use of non-forcible countermeasures, also known as the right of reprisal under
classic international law, " denotes that an aggrieved party may be justified in
responding to "an objectionable behavior on the part of another state."'^ In the domestic
legal system, a wronged individual commonly seeks redress through a third party such as
a court; in the international legal order, a wronged state can resort to a unilateral
remedy. Noting that responsibility is likely to be invoked in cases of breach, Riphagen
observed in article 9(1) of part two of the draft articles on state responsibility that "[T]he
injured state is entitled, by way of reprisals, to suspend the performance of its other
1 c.-\
obligations towards the state which has committed the internationally wrongful act."
Accordingly, economic sanction, as being a form of countermeasure in
international law, can be justified as a state's right against a state that has breached its
international obligations toward the wronged state. Hence, suspension of a treaty
obligation in force, confiscation of goods, economic embargoes and boycotts are possible
countermeasures. Therefore, economic measures through the suspension of a bilateral
treaty or the freezing of the assets of another country, despite their coercive character, are
legitimate if taken in response to prior breaches of obligation. Their legitimacy emanates
'^^ ZOLLER, supra note 96, at 5-6.
ELAGAB, supra note 71, at 44.
'^' ZOLLER, supra note 96, at 4.
Riphagen, Sixth Report on (I) The Content, Forms and Degrees of State Responsibility, and The
Implementation of International Responsibility and the Settlement of Disputes, Doc. A/CN.4/389, 2 Apr.
1985).
See Denis Alland, International Responsibility and sanctions : Selfdefense and counter measures in the
ILC condificaion ofrules governing international responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 147 (Marina Spinedi 8c Bruno Simma, eds., 1987).
Also See Derek W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Forces, 66 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1(1972).
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from the occurrence of the illegal act that has preceded the economic measure.
It has to be noted from the outset that countermeasures do not contradict the
principle of non-intervention. It is important to see cases that reinforce the view that
certain matters are subject to domestic jurisdiction if they are not subject to an
international obligation. In the case of US diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran in
1979, the International Court of Justice ruled out the objection of Iran that the
ramifications of the Islamic revolution in Iran were "essentially and directly within the
national sovereignty of Iran" in the following manner:
Whereas it is of no doubt true that the Islamic revolution of Iran is a matter
"essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran"; whereas,
however, a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and
the detention of internationally protected persons, and involves the
interpretation or application of multilateral conventions codifying
international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, is one
which by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction.'^^
The statement of the ICJ is concisely stipulates that a defaulting state "does not
have a sovereign right to defy its legal obligations." A similar view was reflected
during the debate on the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
'" KAMMINGA, 5M/7ra note 151, at 132.
US Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran, ICJ Reports 1979, at 15-16.
In a later case of 1986, the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,
the ICJ described the principle of non-intervention as constituting 'part and parcel of customary
international law' and elaborated the concept mainly in light of the General Assembly's resolution in the
area:
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each state is
permitted, by the principle of sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political,
economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices which must remain free ones.
The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the essence of, prohibited intervention,
is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force. Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United states), 1986, para.295.
'^^ RICHARD B. LILLICH, ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW FNTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER 70 (1976).
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Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter, The
Dutch representative stated:
I would like to stress that any state, no matter to what region of the world
it belongs, may find itself in a position of suffering damage from illegal
act on the part of another state, and for that reason, would be justified in
taking measures of non violent reprisals.
Consequently, the right to sovereignty and the rule against non-intervention does
not in any way transcend a state's obligation under international law, and any measure
that is targeted to coerce a defaulting state to comply with its international obligation is
permissible. Economic sancdons may not constitute an unlawful intervention if the
motive for their imposition is the enforcement of international law, which may be
constituted from conventional or customary resources. '^^ The puzzle is the degree of
responsibility that is evoked; the issue of whether human rights is a self-contained regime
which has to be enforced by procedures within the treaty or if it is possible to evoke state
responsibility outside of the treaty.
'^^ UNGAOR,23rd sess., 6th com.l045th mtg.,13 dec. 1963.
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The International Court of Justice has put forward the following kinds of huinan rights as having their
basis in customary international law: genocide, racial discrimination, and "[w]rongfully to deprive human
beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constant in conditions of hardship." See
KAMMINGA, supra note, at 23 (citing the Case Concerning Reservations to the Genocide. See also Id. at
133 {citing Namibia Case ,1971 I.C.J. 57). Also Id. at 134 (citing Case Concerning US Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran,
The American Law Institute has similarly envisaged the following in its third restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones
(a) Genocide,
(b) Slavery or slave trade,
(c) The murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) Torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) Prolonged arbitrary detention
(0 Systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) A consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
RESTATMENT THIRD, supra note 64, S.702.
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2. Conditions for Legitimate Economic Countermeasure
It is not difficult to find quite a lot of evidence under international law supporting
the legitimacy of non-forcible countermeasures, although this rule is reduced by strongly
worded exceptions. Although economic sanctions are treated as non-forcible
countermeasures, it is the scope and nature of the exercise of this right that renders them
I 70
legitimate or not. The non-judicial nature of the remedy should not be in any way
understood as being "extra legal". International law stipulates guidelines for the lawful
use of countermeasures; consequently, acts of reprisals are admissible under modem
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international law, subject to certain limitations. The International Law Commission, in
part two of the draft articles, dealt with and squarely addressed the issue of the legitimate
scope of application of countermeasures.
3. Prior breach as a condition for legitimate counter-measures.
As a rule, reprisals are admissible only as a response by the state which has been
subjected to an internationally wrongful act; therefore, the commission of a wrongful act
is a prerequisite to the legitimacy of the reprisal. The debate on draft article 30,
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See ELAGAB, supra note 7 1 , at 4 1
.
'^' MERON, supra note 91, at 234.
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Peter Malanczeek. Counter Measures and SelfDefense as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in
the International Law Commission 's Draft Articles on State responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS
CODIFICATIN OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 212 (M. Spinedi &B. Simma, eds., 1987).
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See Debates on Draft Art. 30 Concerning Legitimate Application ofSanctons, YILC, vol.1, 1979, at 55-
58.
See Id.
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concerning state responsibility, deals with this issue:
The wrongfulness of an act of a state not in conformity with an obligation
of that state towards another state is precluded if the act constitutes a
measure legitimate under international law against that other state, in
consequence of an internationally wrongful act of that other
state, (emphasis added)
Therefore, the principle under international law that countermeasures can be
utilized by an aggrieved party depends basically upon the existence of a prior breach. To
this effect, a tribunal in the case concerning the air services agreement of March 27, 1946,
indicated that international law set a limit on one's resort to non-forcible
countermeasures:
If a situation arises, which, in one state's view, results in the violation of
an international obligation by another state, the first state in entitled,
within the limit set by the general rules of international law pertaining to
the use of armed force, to affirm its right through counter measures.
The deliberations of the sixth committee of the General Assembly on the
Principle of Friendly Relations, the representative of the Netherlands asserted that such
"reprisals were admissible solely in cases where the state against which they were
directed had committed acts which constituted violation of international law in respect of
the state engaging in the reprisals." Hence, the existence of a prior breach and the
taking of the countermeasure by the aggrieved party in response to that is a precondition
for the imposition of economic sanction having a character of reprisal.
'^^ (1979) 2 YB Int'L L.Comtn'n, part II, at 115.
'^^ See International Law Reports, 54(1979) at 337.
'^^ UNGAOR, 23rd Sess., 6th Com., 1095th mtg., Dec. 13, 1968, para. 9 at 3.
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4. Other Conditions Limiting the use of
Economic Sanction for Human Rights Purposes.
In addition to the obvious condition that reprisal can only be taken in response to
a prior illegal conduct of a defaulting state, its legitimacy is still dependent on the
fulfillment of other conditions, depending on the discernible effect it may have on other
norms of international law. Article 14 of the draft article of the ILC on State
Responsibility precludes an injured state from using certain kinds of conduct by way of
countermeasures. Article 14 reads thus:
1. An injured state shall not resort, by way of countermeasure, to:
a) The threat or use of force [in contravention of article 2, paragraph 4 of the
United Nations charter]
b) Any conduct which:
(i) is not in conformity with the rule of international law on the protection
of fiindamental human right;
(ii) is serious prejudice to the normal operation bilateral or multilateral
diplomacy;
(iii) is contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law;
(iv) consists of a breach of a obligation towards any state other than the
state which has committed the internationally wrongful act.
Under draft article 14 l(b)(iii), the ILC endeavors to prohibit the suspension of
obligations constituting peremptory norms of international law by the taking of
countermeasures. As provided in the ILC list, resorting to countermeasures is illegitimate
if it impacts or renders difficult the enjoyment of the human rights of nationals of the
target state. Human rights obligation are also excepted or immune from being subject to
acts of countermeasure under draft article 14(l)(b)(I). The view of the ILC on the issue is
179
reflected in its commentary on countermeasures:
Even where the internationally wrongful act in question would justify a
1 78
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIOANAL LAW, 571(1995).
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reaction involving the use of force, whatever the subject responsible for
applying it, action taken in this guise certainly cannot include, for
instance, a breach of obligations of international humanitarian law. Such
a step could never be "legitimate" and such conduct would remain
^i. HI 95I0O
WTongful.
The issue attracted some attention in Part Two of the draft articles on State
Responsibility, and the proposal by Special Rapporteur Riphagen dealt with the issue of
illegitimacy of the conduct which breached a peremptory norm of genera international
181
law. In his fourth report, he noted that the existence of rules of international law for
1 82
the protection of human rights "precluded reprisals" and asserted that "there are other
objective regimes which impose on states the respect of human right, whatever the
nationality of the person affected, and whatever the circumstances. Reprisals in breach of
such rules are obviously inadmissible, even if they do not amount to an international
,,183
cnme.
Professor Riphagen observed the following state responsibility in relation to jus
cogens:
An internationally wrongful act of a state does not entail an obligation for
that state or a right for another state to the extent that the performance of
that obligation or the exercise of that right would be incompatible with a
peremptory norm of general international law even if the same or another
peremptory norm of general international law permits such performance or
exercise m that case.
I so
UN Doc. AC/CN. 4/366/ Add. I, 15 Apr. 1983, par.47, at. 17.
'^' UN Doc. A/CN. 4/354/ Add. 2, May 1982, Para. 139, at 11.
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ELAGAB, supra note 7 1 , at 1 1
.
'^^ Id at 102.
See Riphagen, TTiird report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of State Responsibility, Doc. A/CN.
4/354, May 1982, at 11.
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The foregoing shows that the taking of a countermeasure by an aggrieved party in
contravention to or derogation from norms of human rights law, ahhough the
countermeasure is a legitimate consequence of a prior illegal act.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is relevant in an examination of
the issue. The Convention does not permit a party to suspend or withdraw the operation
of a treaty by a state party so as it can enforce international norms of human rights. Of
course, a suspension or withdrawal from a treaty obligation is prohibited , as a matter of
general rule, if the treaty concerns the protection of a human person, pursuant to article
60(5). Article 42(2) of the Vienna Convention also stipulates that the legal effect of a
treaty can be caused only in accordance with the applications of the treaty or the Vienna
185
Convention itself. Such defined rule against suspension is necessary to establish a
stable legal regime of treaty law thus restricting the use of countermeasures by
suspending treaties. Moreover, article 60(1) of the Convention also restricts the
invocation of a material breach of another treaty in order to suspend the legal effect of a
separate treaty. The wording of the paragraph clearly suggests that "a state may not
terminate a treaty on the ground that a material breach of treaty B was committed"
Article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides an
exception to the rule set out under the foregoing subsection by providing that paragraphs
1 -3 of article 60 do not apply to "provisions relating to the protection of human persons
185
"The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take place only as a
result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or the present Convention. The same rule applies to
suspension of the operation of a treaty." The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art.42, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
See also Theodore Meron et al., State Responsibilityfor Violations ofHuman Rights, 83 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC.372, 374 (1989).
'*S^. at 374-375.
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contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting
any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties" This provision
precludes the suspension of any existing treaty obligation a means of countermeasure if
such use may have a negative impact, on the human rights of individuals.
Since the 1960s, international human right law has evolved into recognized legal
standards through convention, international custom and general principles of law.
Here, the obvious difficulty is to identify the international norms that may be categorized
as fundamental human rights. With such a designation, one could judge whether or not
the use of economic sanctions would directly impact on the norms of fundamental htiman
rights, even when certain groups of rights are enforced at the expense of others.
Although the exception made by the ILC prohibits the taking of counter-measures
which have an impact on the protection of fundamental human rights, there is a difference
of views on what constitutes fundamental human rights. If rights are weighted on the
basis of their significance to individuals and the community at large, the taking of
countermeasures through the use of economic sanctions should be prohibited. Such
measures make the protection of some basic economic rights such as the right to food, the
right to work difficult or at times impossible to attain.
Economic sanctions may be used to enforce the civil and political rights, which
are said to constitute the pillars and being preemptive of all other kinds of rights.
Sanctions to promote civil and political rights have an indispensable ramification on the
exercise of social and economic rights of the population of the target state, rights which
are obviously understood as being more fundamental and preemptive in the developing
1 07
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.42, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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ELAGAB, supra note 70, at 101.
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world. Economic sanctions can, in other words, be taken as a countermeasure that
suspends a state's obligation to promote the respect of universal or multilateral treaties
affecting economic and social rights.
Because some of economic and social human rights are indeed fundamental, then
the exercise of unilateral economic measures that violate the observance of such
economic and social rights would go contrary to the enjoyment of these rights. Economic
sanction creates a great impediment on the realization of human rights by exposing the
national of the target state to economic deteriorations.
The imposition of economic sanction through the suspension or termination of
economic and trade treaties and other related treaties, even if designed to coerce a
defaulting state to comply with its human right obligations, is not, therefore, legitimate.
The imposition of economic sanctions supposes the ensuing suffering of human beings as
the sole means of success. The immediate target of economic sanction is the innocent
population of the target state, whose economic suffering and chaos is anticipated to
coerce a change of government or influence the leaders to alter their policies. Thus the
right of a state to suspend, withdraw or denounce a treaty for the purpose of imposing
economic sanction against another state is restricted.
Some practical illustrations may be cited in which economic sanctions were used
in a manner that was more or less compatible to the needs of the victims innocent
population of the target country. When France retaliated in May 1979 against the Central
1 89
For instance, trade embargoes restrict the target's access to both export market and import markets,
disrupting the economy of the target country. Investment and capital sanctions, in the form of disinvestment
or financial sanctions, may similarly cause significant economic damage to the target state. Disinvestment
may have the long-term impact of shrinking the working capital stock in the target country which, in turn,
causes the transfer of capital from the target country. Financial sanctions also produce a quantity constraint
of foreign exchange as a result of the target's inability to access significant sources of foreign exchange. See
KAEMPFER & LOWERBERG, supra note 8, at 65-80.
67
African Republic for the massacre of 85 young people by Bokassa's security forces by
suspending its financial cooperation agreement with the regime, it exempted from the
measure financial assistance in the areas of education, food and medicine. Needed
commodities were also excluded from an embargo when the United States imposed a
total blockade of trade relations in 1986 against Libya by way of countermeasure. In this
action, the US embargoed the export to Libya of any goods, technology or services from
the United States except publications and donations of articles intended to relieve human
suffering such as food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for
191
medical purposes. Economic sanctions meant to promote civil and political rights that
take effect through the suspension of social and economic rights in the target state
through the suffering of its civilian population are illegitimate.
C. The Concept of State Responsibility' for Human Rights Violations
The issue of state responsibility for human rights violations is not an area that has
been subject to scholarly scrutiny. The invocation of state responsibility for human rights
violations has not been a focus of discussion among scholars and only few have dealt
with it. But the issue calls forth a number of difficult questions surroundmg the
principles of international law. It is with good reason that one has to seek the relationship
See generally Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy ofInternational Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1-
10(1986).
191
192
'^'
Id
International lawyers have not made a sound effort to discuss the enforcement of human rights in
relation to the general law Of state responsibility. Few, if any, have investigated human rights in reference
to the responsibility that the defaulting state incurs. See Theodore Meron & M. McCarthy, State
Responsibilityfor Violations ofHuman Rights, 83 Proc. Am. Soc't Int'L L. 372(1989).
Theodore Meron , for example, advances the idea that the relation of state responsibility to human rights
can be exploiated in a manner important to the field of human rights law. See Id.
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between the law of human rights and that of state responsibihty. Judge Lachs remarked in
his general course on public international law at the Hague Academy of International
Law:
The question of international responsibility for violation of human rights
has been the subject of lively discussion among jurists. In the light of the
law in force, this responsibility may be far reaching, resulting as it does
from principles generally accepted, while the obligations inserted in a
treaty are subject to the limits of each nation's commitment '^^.
His remarks addressed the question of whether human rights treaties are self-
contained regimes whereby the violation of human rights can be addressed only through
the procedure provided with the treaty itself or whether the remedy may be sought outside
of the treaty by invoking the laws of state responsibility. An attempt to restrain the
remedy of human rights within the mechanisms provided under the treaty, would render
human rights obligations mainly "sanctionless"' because international obligation in the
area of human rights mostly lack an enforcement mechanism. Simma argues that any
thesis which advocates the pursuance of the available remedies within the human rights
treaty itself, would render the international treaties pertaining to human rights at a
"quality lower" than those of other kinds of treaties. In addition, he argues that "in a
latter case one can rely on diplomatic means of enforcement, on the various procedures of
dispute settlement and in the last instance, on the self-help by peaceful means, while with
respect to human rights treaties one would have to remain content with pure
'^^ M. Lachs, General Course in Public International Law, 169 RCADI (1980)Vol.IV, at 70.
'^^ RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FORTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 279-280(1989).
'^V^. at 281.
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'stimulation.' ". This vividly describes the problem inherent in the law of human rights
lack of self-contained regime. The paper recognizes the power of states to resort to
countermeasures including that of economic sanctions to enforce . It departs on how
states can resort to measures where the wrong doing does not directly affect their interest
when they are responding to another states violation of international law of human rights.
1 The Notion of Injured State and Third Party Remedy under International Law
It is important to have a clear understanding of the notion of an injured state
before considering the concept of state responsibility. The term, "injured state," is
equated with the term, "directly injured state," and is contrasted with the designation,
"indirectly injured state," which describes a state that has sustained no material injury but
has suffered injury to its "legal interests." Dupuy uses the term, "directly injured states,"
to describe states which have incurred subjective or personal damage as a consequence of
the commission of a crime. "Indirectly injured states" are states whose objective
interests have not undergone any particular harm to their interest, but which are
"nevertheless directly concerned, by the fact that an obligation ignored attacks the public
201
order of the international community to which they belong." The latter definition lends
credibility to the notion that responsibility is evoked in the context of human rights.
In modem international law, whether only a state directly affected by the
international wrongful act is entitled to resort to responsive measures or whether third
199
Id.
^°° PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES, in International Crimes ofState: A critical anaysis oflLC'S
Draft article 19 on State Responsibility I79(Joseph H.H. Weiler et a!., 1989)
^°'/c/.at 179-180.
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states may take action on the delinquent state are debatable issues. " Whether or not the
sanction-imposing state must be the injured state is unclear in international law.
Consequently, the definition of "injured state" is directly pertinent to human rights, as it
poses a critical question. When a state violates the human rights of its own nationals in
contravention of its international law obligations, obvious questions arise as to which
subjects of international law suffer injury- whether the international community as a
203
whole or only the nationals of the breaching states.
This is a relevant discussion in relation to the issue of whether who can take a
response for the breaches of the laws of human rights. At this juncture, two approaches
are evident. The first approach was supplied by the International Law Commission,
which considered that in international law "there is always a correlation between the
obligation of one subject and the subjective right of another." In other words,
international responsibility does not "exist in abstracto" and must be exercised against
one or many subjects of international law. In this case, when a certain international
obligation is breached, one state or group of states can be considered to be injured in their
207
rights. When a certain multilateral human right treaty is infringed, the defaulting state
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See MALANCZUK, supra note 1 72, at 230.
Third party remedy was molded into a concrete legal concept by the attempts of the international
Court of Justice to introduce erga omnes obligations in the Barcelona Traction Case( Case Concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light and power Company Ltd., ICJ Reports at 33, para.33(1970). and by that of the
International commission of Jurists concerning international crimes(See Article 19 of the Draft Articles on
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may owe an obligation to all states, depending on whether the breached obligation
belongs to a norm having erga omnes character. Such multilateral human rights treaties
do characteristically establish "obligations that run from each party toward all other
208
states." The second approach is that the state or states that are injured by the breach of
the international obligation can obtain a remedy, but "subjects not injured in their rights
cannot bring an international claim." This precludes the taking of any measure by any
210
state which has not suffered an infringement of its subjective rights
For instance, in the case of a breach of a multilateral treaty. Article 60(2)(b) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows a party particularly affected by a
breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the treaty as a whole or in part, as the case
may be between itself and the defaulting state. This precludes other states not particularly
affected from unilaterally suspending a treaty in response to the breach. Of immense
concern is the issue of whether or not states can unilaterally demand third party remedies.
The term "injured state" does not appear to set a limitation on the ability of states to take
effective countermeasures for certain kinds of violations. This doctrine has a firm
foundation these days with the growing concession that states not directly and materially
affected have a right to a pursue remedy under international law.
Third party remedy holds that third states, which are not materially affected, may
213
respond to certain serious violations of international law having great importance.
These third state remedies evolved mainly after World War II. The United Nations
'''id. ax 165.
'''
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See Jonathan I. Chamey, Third state Remedies in International Law, 10 Mich. J. INT'L. L. 57, 59
(1989).
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Charter recognized a role for collective remedy in respect to breaches of international
peace and security. Through the Security Council, the United Nations may take
enforcement action against the breaching state, and the enforcing states of such a
resolution need not have a direct vested interest in the matter.
Contrary to the commonly accepted traditional view that remedies under public
international law are available to states that had sustained damage to their legal interest,
third state remedy by a non-injured state against a wrongdoing state can be sought under
certain circumstances. Under certain situations, a state not materially injured by the
illegal behavior of the wrongdoing state may have the right to seek a remedy under
international law. In a case before the ICJ, the British government held that Albania's
reluctance to pay damages contrary to the decision against her in the Corfu Channel
217
case, entitled all states "to take all reasonable and legitimate steps as may be open to
them to prevent such an occurrence, and either individually or by common action to do
what they can to ensure that judgment... is duly implemented and carried out."
The issue of the right of a third state to legal remedy law was extensively dealt
with in the ILC's draft work on the Law of Treaties .In its consideration of third state
remedy, the ILC has clearly and significantly defined the concept of an injured state. The
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Chamey, supra note 21 1, at 59.Despite this general rule of international law, a long established
opinion holds that third states are considered injured parties in cases of grave breaches of international law
concerning matters of great importance. Id
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ILC defined characteristics of the injured state for the purpose of responsibility involving
the breach of multilateral treaties or norms of international customary law:
1 . For the purpose of the present article, "injured state" means any state a
right of which is infringed by the act of another state, if that act
constitutes, in accordance with part I of the present articles, an
internationally wrongful act of that state.
2. In particular, "injured state" means:
(a) If the right infringed by the act of a state arises from a bilateral treaty, the
other state party to the treaty;
(b) If the right infringed by the act of a state arises from a judgment or other
binding dispute settlement decision of an international court or tribunal,
the other state or states parties to the dispute and entitled to the benefit of
that right;
(C) If the right infringed by the act of a state arises from a binding decision of
an international organ other than an international court or tribunal, the
state or states which, in accordance with the constituent instrument of the
international organization concerned, are entitled to the benefit of that
right;
(d) If the right infringed by the act of a state arises fi-om a treaty provision for
a third state, that third state;
(e) If the right infringed by the act of a state arises from multilateral treaty or
from a rule of customary international law, any other state party to the
multilateral treaty or bound by the relevant rule of customary international
law, if it is established that:
(I) The right has been created or is established in its favor
(ii) The infringement of the right by the act of a state necessarily
affected the enjoyment of the right or the performance of the
obligation of the other states parties to the multilateral treaty or
bound by the rule of customary international law: or
(iii)The right has been created or is established for the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedom.
(f) If the right infringed by the act of state arises from a multilateral treaty,
any other party to the multilateral treaty, if it is established that the right
has been expressly stipulated in that treaty for the protection of the
collective interests of the states parties thereto.
3. In addition, an "injured state" means, if the internationally wrongful act
constitutes an international crime [and in the context of the rights and
obligations of states under articles 14 and 15], all other states.
220
(1985) 2 YB Int'l L. Comm'n, Part II, at 25.
The concept of the injured state, was not enthusiastically received by the sixth committee of the General
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Thus, the ILC, in its definition of an "injured state," includes parties to bilateral
treaties, which are entitled to the benefit of the binding decision of a dispute settlement
tribunal or organ, as well as third states that are beneficiaries of treaty obligations. The
ILC list of "injured states" indicates that they are designated as beneficiaries of certain
legal obligations that may be transgressed, except the notion of "injured state" which is
defined in reference to human rights in par. 2(e)(iii) and that of international crimes under
par. 3. It is explicitly provided that a state which sustained no direct injury to its legal
interest could be considered to be an injured state. The International Law Commission
further elaborated the nature of par. 2(e)(iii) by underlying that "[t]he interests protected
by [rules of international law concerning the obligation of states to respect human rights
222
and fundamental freedoms] are not allocatable to a particular state."
The other area of third state remedy which is very important to this paper is
223
considered under the ILC draft concerning the provisions dealing international crimes.
The ILC developed a cogent doctrine in art. 19(2) of the draft article on state
responsibility, which stated that the protection of certain obligations is so essential and
Assembly. Although some delegations agreed to the above definition of "injured state" by the ILC, most
delegates felt that the definition failed to distinguish between a state that has sustained a direct damage and
those that have sustained an indirect one. Moreover, these delegates who were critical about the issue
expressed their opinion that article 5 should cover only the former category and in any case, the more
extreme remedies should only be available to states that had been directly injured. See KAMMINGA, at
169-170.
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rights. It thus reads: 3. ..an international crime may result, inter alia, from: a serious breach on a
widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being,
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fundamental that their breach constitutes an international crime. The draft states that
the term "injured state" refers to "all other states" if the internationally wrongful act
"constitutes an international crime." '"^ This also stands as the exception to the rule that
third states which are not tangibly injured by a breach of international law carmot legally
resort to remedial action.
Even more important for the purpose of this paper is the inclusion in the definition
that an "injured state" which suffered no direct harm is entitled to a remedy. Still to be
resolved is whether or not a state is entitled to unilaterally respond against another state
for its commission of an internationally wrongful act constituting a breach of its human
rights obligations.
Since such a violation would breach multilateral treaties that create an
international norm in the area, could any of the parties to a multilateral convention
unilaterally resort to a remedy even when the violation left it with no material damage?
Is it possible for states to resort to unilateral countermeasures to vindicate the interest of
the international community and take the law into their own hands? More often than not,
the violation of human rights in one country does not directly affect the sanction-
imposing state. Although the interest of a third state may be remote or absent, it is
indispensable; thus, the law of human rights is effectively enforced through third state
224
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remedies. The violation of international human rights may generate a legal interest and
dictate action by third states, in spite of the intangible nature of the interest of the other
state. The puzzle is in determining how this remedy should be exercised. Should it be
exercised unilaterally or collectively?
In the Nicaragua Case, the court attempted to address the illegitimacy of resorting
to a unilateral third party remedy for the enforcement of human rights in a separate
paragraph from the one that contained the concept of erga omnes obligations. It read as
follows:
However, on the universal level, the instruments which embody human
rights do not confer on the state the capacity to protect the victims of
infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality. It is therefore
still on the regional level that a solution to this problem has had to be
sought; thus, within the Council of Europe..., the problem of admissibility
encountered by the claim in the present case has been resolved by the
European Convention on Human Rights, which entitles each state which is
a party to the convention to lodge a complaint against any other
contracting state for the violation of the convention, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim.
As is indicated in this paragraph, the ICJ did not intend to entitle a state whose
interests were not directly affected to take a measure. In other words, parties to universal
human rights treaties, including the Covenant of Human Rights, do not have a legal
entitlement to seek any unilateral remedy against the wrongful act of the breaching
227
State. Where the human rights violation is perpetrated by a state agamst its own
nationals, the interest of no other state is particularly affected, and "no single state is
228
necessarily more affected by the breach than any other state." Therefore, "all states
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports, 1986.
^^^ KAMMINGA, 5w/7ra note 151, at 154-155.
Id. at 66.
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bound by the obligation are equally injured by the breach." Consequently, no single
state should be entitled to claim a remedy, and such a measure should be carried out
through a collective means of enforcement.
Most writers on third state remedies do not support a wide use of this remedy.
Akehurst, for example, applies the idea of third state remedies to only three areas, namely
the enforcement of judicial decisions, breaches of multilateral agreements and violations
of rules prohibiting the use of force. He stands firm in his disapproval of third state
reprisals on the ground that such remedies would be more harmful than beneficial to
23
1
international relations. Tunkin, who the leading Soviet expert on international law,
similarly insists that third state remedies be circumvented to breaches of peace, threats to
breach the peace, acts of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
colonialism. Meron subjects obligation having erga omnes character to third states
remedies and argues that international laws of human rights have an attribute.
Although the ILC work on the law of State Responsibility is the main document
advocating a wider support of third state remedies, this source also sets limits on how
third party remedy should be exercised. The recent approach of the ILC suggests a
more restricted application by adopting a narrower scope to norms having an erga omens
character and by limiting the use of third state remedy to the commission of international
229
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crimes. Most importantly, , it was emphasized that such a remedy must be imposed by
a collective decision or authorized by the same. The view that a third state remedy
should be exercised by collective decision and by an international organization will be
pursued in detail.
A unilateral economic sanction upon states breaching norms of human rights
creates a situation whereby powerful states become "self-appointed policemen" without
any kind of judicial or multilateral determination of the case. Professor Graefrath
strongly condemns the use unilateral countermeasures for violations of norms having erga
omnes character or for international crimes as follows:
From being faced with an international crime or another violation of erga
omnes obligation, it does not, however, follow that every state not directly
affected apart from or independently, of the decisions of the Security
Council, would have the right to apply individually sanctions exceeding
what is called 'unfriendly measures'.
He reasons that using sanctions as pretexts to justify intervention in other states
238
would undermine the role of international law. Despite the significance of third party
remedies for the enforcement of human rights, their unilateral exercise in a form of
economic sanctions is restricted because the injury is supposedly sustained by the
international community and not any particular state; therefore, a universal remedy
should be sought. Moreover, it is not ever desirable for a state to claim enforcement of an
235
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obligation erga omnes and then attribute international responsibility on a state which it
thinks has breached the norm, for such conduct will likely produce chaos in international
relations. The application of this type of unilateral economic measure is totally
unacceptable, since a state may well abuse the right and thus injure another state by
239
taking "remedial" action when such a step is neither justified nor necessary.
Third state remedies should therefore be used either by the international community
as a whole through the collective decision-making process of an international
organization or through the authorization of the same. This does not presuppose a breach
to a tangible right of any state but only to the legal right of the international community
which reflects the interest of the international community. The community at large should
respond to the violation through a collective decision-making process. Consequently,
economic sanctions for enforcing human rights should only be sought through
international organizations.
239
See Chamey, supra note 21 1 , at 87.
CHAPTER V
THE LEGALITY OF USING COLLECTIVE
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS
As a general rule, an economic sanction that a state or a group of states may take
unilaterally to enforce a human rights violation is not justifiable, for the reasons seen in
the foregoing discussion. However, this does not mean that a state breaching its
multilateral human right obligations under international law will go unchallenged. Nor
does it mean that it is not possible to apply state responsibility for the enforcement of
human rights. As Professor Frowlein so aptly stated, "Human rights guarantees which
cannot be protected by some action, however weak, are not worth the ink with which they
•^ ,,240
are written.
A. Human Rights Having a Peremptory
and Erga Omnes Character and Those Constituting International Crimes
Certain human right norms have acquired a special status under contemporary
international law. Unlike the traditional notion of international legal system which
classified all norms of international law under a uniform legal regime, modem
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jurisprudence incorporates the concept of hierarchical norms , as the one known in the
domestic legal system. " Certain norms should be placed at a "higher" level than
"ordinary" international obligations because of their special importance to the
international community.
'^
In order to distinguish more important human rights from less important ones,
more important rights are categorized either as having erga omnes character or as having
similar but not identical labels, such as "jus cogens," "non-derogable rights" or
"international crimes." This had resulted in the final emergence of the concepts of
"International crimes of states," "erga omnes," and "jus cogens." ' Article 103 of the UN
Charter and the concept of non-derogable rights are also other references of normative
values acquiring supreme status. Generally, the difference between the concept of jus
cogens, obligation having an erga omnes character and international crimes is very
technical. While the concept of international crime begins with the distinction between
international crimes from other wrongful acts, both on the ground of the special regime of
responsibility, the idea of erga omnes is strictly and exclusively limited to the latter
part. The theor>' of jus cogens posits the possible limits on the contractual freedom of
248
states attempting to override "higher norms".
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1. Perempton- norms
The concept of jus cogens, also known as the peremptor>' norms of international
law, has been defined under article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
in the following way:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
Emphasizing the universal character of peremptory norms, the International Law
Commission stated: "It would seem contradictory if, in the case of breach of a rule so
important to the entire international community as to be described as 'peremptor>',' the
relationship of responsibihty was established solely between the state which committed
250
the breach and the state directly injured by it." Thus a violation of a peremptory norm
constitutes a breach of the legal interest of the international community, like that of
norms of erga omnes character. Although the set of rules of human rights having
peremptory effect is not clearly defined, prohibitions against genocide, slavery and racial
discrimination and those rights which constitute part of customary international law are
frequently cited as examples of human rights constituting jus cogens. It could be seen
that these kind of human rights are similar no those human rights having an erga omnes
character.
249 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 28, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S.331.
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2. Human Rights as International Crimes.
Other violations of human rights may be categorized as "international crimes";
they, too, need further clarification. The classification of certain groups of human rights
violations as international crimes originated during the codification of the ILC draft
252
articles on state responsibility. The concept of international crime was extensively
dealt under article 19, part I, and was defined as follows:
1
.
An act of a state which constitutes a breach on an international obligation is an
internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject matter of the obligation
breached.
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach of any state of
an obligation essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the
international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that
community as a whole, constitutes an international crime.
3. Subject to paragraph two, and on the basis of the rules of international law in
force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from:
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that
prohibiting aggression;
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the
establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination;
(C) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of
essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as
those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the high seas.
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in
253
accordance with paragraph 2, constitutes an international delict.
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The draft explicitly includes certain kinds of human rights violations in the family
of international crime under paragraph 3(c). Two points can be deduced from the
paragraph: first, a human rights violation is classified as an international crime if it
depending on its degree of importance: second, the violation should be serious,
systematic and carried out on a wide scale.
3. Human Rights Having an Erga Omnes Character.
The concept of erga omnes is basically concerned with questions of who may
invoke responsibility for international crimes. This concept runs contrary to the
traditional view under international law that only the wrongdoing state and the state
victim of the wrongdoing are involved in the issue international responsibility for the
wrongful act. Such a bilateralist approach gave rise to the idea that "only the party to
257
whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach."
This was gradually changed to a new regime whereby "any violation of international law
258
has. ...two types of injury: injury to the target state and injury to the public order."
The underlying question concerning the obligation erga omnes revolves around
who has the right to respond in case of the breaches of such norms: a unilateral third state
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not directly or all states through a collective measure. Although a consensus is not easy
to obtain, the argument tilts towards the support of the latter. Unilateral acts have usually
been criticized as increasing international tension, and as one observer described it, "the
risk of making an improper use of counter-measures can not be discarded, but the
alternative may well be that common interests of international society are not protected
by law." The rapporteur of the ILC have at different times articulated the idea of the
institutional nature of erga omnes obligations by asserting that "it is not all states, but
rather the international community that is envisaged as a possible bearer of the right of
reaction." Such view find its basis in the rationale of the argument that "since third
state enforcement reflects community interest, the community in question should respond
collectively to the breach." Since the idea of international community is an "abstract"
one, the community interest finally concretizes through an international institution which
has a universal character, in other words the United Nations. It has even been agreed
that the United Nations has the power of representing the international community when
issues of "maintenance of the peace" so requires. Accordingly, the former rapporteur of
the ILC, Riphagen wrote that "the organized international community, that is the United
Nations Organization, has a role to play in determining the special legal consequences
entailed by [international crime], even if the maintenance of international peace and
security is not considered to be involved"
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RESPONSIBILITY 238( J. Weiler et al., 1989).
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The enforcement of these norms are left to a great extent to third state remedies,
as supported by the ICJ itself. In an often quoted dictum of the Barcelona Traction
case, the ICJ upheld third state remedies for enforcement of erga omnes obligations:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligation of the
state towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-a-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature, the former are the concern of all states. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection: they are obligation Erga Omnes...
such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law,
fi-om the outlawing of acts of aggression and of genocide, as also from the
principle and rules concerning the basic rights...some of the corresponding
rights of protection have entered into the body of general international
law..., others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or
quasi-universal character.
In this case, the ICJ indicated that some kinds of obligations give rise to a
collective interest in the international community and hence it recognizes the legal
interest of states in the protection of the breaches of obligation erga omnes. Such
obligations refer to those particular norms under international law, which do not merely
create a duty on a state vis-a-vis another contracting state, but to the international
community as a whole.
This does not however mean that unilateral measures is completely ruled out. One exception
where unilateral measures by third states is allowed is in the case ofjudicial remedies for violation of erga
omnes obligations. This idea, implicated by the decision of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case and
maintained by the ILC confirms the fact that third states are entitled to seek responsibility from breaches of
erga omnes obligations through proper judicial channels. [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 99, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 47SER.4/ 1976/Add.l(part 2) Although it was initially declared by the ICJ that the concept of actio
popularis is not known in international law in the South West Africa cases, the court acknowledged the
existence of the right in the international legal system at the Barcelona Traction case. Bring the Ethiopian
citation and case here.
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The Barcelona Traction case identified certain human rights as being intrinsic to
human values and classified violations of these rights as obligations owed to the
international community as a whole. Nevertheless, the list of those human rights having
an erga omnes character is not exhaustive since there is only a partial mention of the
prohibition of aggression and "those principles and rules concerning the basic rights of
the human person, including protection from slaver>' and racial discrimination." Other
obligations in the sphere of human rights are also regarded as having erga omnes
character.
It is evident that the enumeration of both those human rights norms having erga
omnes character and those that can be labeled as international crimes are non- exhaustive
and mainly limited to human rights of a similar nature. Although it is difficult to derive
an exhaustive and definitive list of this type of violation, most persons will agree that the
practice of systematic torture can be classified as an international crime. Moreover,
some norms of human rights set certain minimum standards of human protection by
designating certain human rights as inviolable, allowing no derogation, be it in time of
war or public emergency situations. The common thread in all definitions of
The statement in the Barcelona Traction case is an evolution as well as a reversal from the stance that the
court held in the South West African cases. In 1970, four years before the famous dictum in the Barcelona
Traction case, the court held that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have either a legal right or an interest to
institute a claim against South Africa for its policy of racial discrimination, a right that the court classified
as having an erga omnes character in the Barcelona Traction case. ICJ Reports ( 1 966) at 5 1 . See also
KAMMINGA, supra note 1 5 1, at 153. The court reasoned that the counterpart of an actio popular is not
known to international law as it stands at the present. KAMMINGA, supra note 151, at 194.
"° See KAMMINGA, supra note 151, at 157.
'''
Id.
^^^ Mat 160-161.
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See KAMMINGA, supra x\o\t 151, at 158. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
prohibits any derogation from the right to life under article 6, the right against torture or any other
inhumane treatment under article 7, the right against slavery and servitude under article 8, tic.Id.
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peremptor>' norms, norms of human rights having an erga omnes obligation and those
breaches constituting international crimes is their "recognition as such by the
international community as a whole." For example, the ICJ classification of certain
kinds of violations as obligation erga omnes is premised on the idea that these human
rights violations are considered as being of special importance for all members of the
27S
international community. This principle affirms that there is a "need for universal
solidarity in dealing with the most serious assaults on international order." The ILC
also attempted to distinguish between different kinds of international wrongful acts which
dictate different kinds of responsibility, namely international derelicts and international
277
crimes, classifying the latter as crimes against the international community as a whole.
This trend of development, noted the ILC, signifies the emergence of a set of norms
which place specific obligations on states and whose fulfillment represents an increased
278
collective interest of the part of the entire international community.
Therefore, the remedy that should be sought for certain kinds of human rights
affecting the international community as a whole, and which may be called "universal
injuries," those that affect the entire international community, differs from unilateral and
multilateral injuries, which are defined as injuries to a particular aggrieved party or
parties. The remedies for the different kinds of injuries also differ. Ago expressed this
position as follows: "International law must evolve along the same lines as municipal
^'' KAMMINGA, supra note 1 5 1 , at 1 59.
^'" MALANCZUK, supra note 172, at 233.
'''
Id.
^" See R. AGO, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 2 (1976).
278,.
Id. at 3 1
.
^''^See ELIZABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US LEGISLATION
99(1985).
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law and derive at a distinction between two kinds of breaches: those affecting only the
280
injured state and those which, instead, affect the community of Nations." According to
this analogy, the community interest in the municipal legal system is protected by public
law, and this law is enforced through the use of coercive measures by the state in the
28 i
name and behalf of the community. However, because victims of human rights
violations do not, as a general rule, have a voice in the international arena, human right
violations must be addressed differently, through a "special mechanism and a special
282
regime," rather than by sporadic unilateral measures. The presence of an organized
system of sanctions where the world community interest is maintained is similarly a trend
to be followed in the international legal order.
The undesirability of resorting to economic countermeasures against a state
breaching its human rights obligation is reflected in many forms and in many forums. At
the 38th session of the General Assembly, the representative of the German Democratic
Republic spoke as follows in the sixth committee:
The concept that one or several states could punish another state might
lead to the elimination of the sovereign equality of state. ..Its result would
not be to strengthen but to weaken the international legal system, which
was based on the duty of peaceful cooperation among equal, albeit very
283
different, sovereign states...
Collective economic sanctions, reflecting a collective interest, are usually
regarded as having widespread legitimacy. Thus, a measure taken by an international
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International Law. in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
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organization would not be considered as an act of intervention, for its members have
284
accorded it with a certain degree of authority, thus impHcitly recognizing its authority.
Although the desirability of universal economic sanctions is of less a concern,
it has to be noted that the idea of collective responsibility should be applied when one
talks about holding a state responsible for its acts and impose a sanction thereafter. The
effect of economic sanction will harm the innocent nationals of the state violating the
norm, those same group of people which are victims of the violation of the norms of
human rights, thus bringing "pain to innocents much more that to those responsible in
285
government" Economic sanctions have the inherent character of evoking collective
responsibility. This however is a price that has to be paid
,
if sanctions are used for
legitimate purposes in a legitimate way. If sanctions are avoided by the international
community because of their feature of giving rise to collective responsibility, "a
paradoxical situation arises, where countries committing crimes stand a great chance of
escaping forceful international reaction as long as they are run by despotic regimes or
dictators."^^^
B. The Competence of the United Nations to Deal with Human Rights.
At present, there exists only one international organization whose objectives are
universal in nature: the United Nations. The remedy for the kinds of human rights
violations that cause universal injuries to the legal interest of the international community
and that have a customary normative character, should be provided through the system of
^^"^
Evan Luard, Collective Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 159(Hedley Bui.,
ed.,1984)
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the United Nations for the international community as a whole.
The legitimacy of the measures emanates from the universal nature of the
organization and the importance of certain kinds of human rights norms to the
international community as a whole. Moreover, the role of the United Nations as a
universal organ for enforcing human rights through various mechanisms, including the
use of coercive economic measures, finds its legitimacy in the Charter of the organization
itself. According to the Charter, member states have agreed to promote and encourage
human rights in pursuance to article 3 and have pledged themselves to take joint and
separate action to promote "the universal respect for, and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
The legal effect of these provisions has since been debatable. One writer for
example has argued that the endorsement of the word "pledge" manifestly provides a
288
duty on the states not to infringe the promotion of human rights. On the other hand,
Akehust expresses an opposite view by contending that an endorsement of the word itself
does not create a positive obligation on states to observe human rights. As Akerust
wrote:
The use of the word "pledge". ..implies a legal obligation, but the
obligation is probably not to observe human right law now...but to work
towards their fulfillment in the future: the vagueness of the language
probably leaves a wide discretion to states about the speed and the means
of carrying out their obligation, and it is notorious that in many countries
no perceptible progress and little imperceptible progress, has been made
towards the realization of human rights. On the other hand, a state which
deliberately moves backwards as far as human rights are concerned would
probably be regarded as having broken article 56: certainly, this is the
287
The United Nations is the only organization that may be directly concerned with the breach of erga
omnes obligations. See ZOLLER, supra note 96, at 1.
288
See Kevin W. Ferguson Brown, the Legality ofEconomic Sanction Against South Africa in
Contemporary International Law, South Africa Yearbook of International Law, 63 (Vol. 14, 1988-1989).
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attitude of most members of the United Nations towards the South African
poHcy of apartheid."
Be this as it may, the Charter of the United Nations has been fully be utilized as a
"constitutional document" to effectuate laws of human rights.
28Q
AKEHURST, A Modem Introduction to International Law, 66-67 (6th ed. 1987).
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1. The Principle of Non-Intenention and the United Nations.
The United Nations Charter contains numerous human rights provisions.
Nonetheless, lack of clarit>', as well as lack of substantive and procedural provisions, has
undermined its legal effect." One problem is the inclusion of a provision in the Charter
that precludes the organization from interfering in matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the member states. This primar>' tool was used as a defense by member
states who had committed massive human rights violations to restrain the United Nations
293
from any scrutiny based on the human rights provision of the Charter.
In such kind of situation, the pressing task is to distinguish between human rights
that fall essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state and those that are protected
under the international law regime. A close reading of Article 2(7) illumines its meaning
294
in two respects. First, the application of Article 2(7) does not set a legal limitation
against the enforcement measures adopted under chapter VII of the Charter. Second,
under article 2(7) is only limited to areas which are essentially domestic and does not
290
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Article 2(7) of the LTN Charter stipulates that "nothing that is contained in the charter authorizes the
UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state..."
The argument relating to the taking of a measure by the United Nations in the areas of domestic
jurisdiction is defeated by the assertion that once a matter constitutes a threat to international peace and
security, it ceases to be, as a point of law, a matter falling "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of
a state, as improvised under article 2(7) of the Charter.
Article 2(7), which seemingly created a limitation in the competence of the organization by
impeding it from interfering in the domestic affairs of states, provides an exception to the application of
the rule by stating that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
chapter VII."
^^^ KAMMINGA, supra note 1 5 1 , at 67.
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apply to matters which are othen^ise. ^ The Charter of the United Nations has,
moreover, explicitly stated that one of its purposes pertains to the promotion and
protection of human rights. Yet, according to Lauterpacht, the notion of intervention,
as set forth in the Charter, is limited to "dictatorial, mandatory interference intended to
exercise direct pressure upon the state concerned" and has therefore a very restricted
effect. Lillich wrote:
There has scarcely been a case of major proportions in which the
principle of domestic jurisdiction has not been invoked; where
transnational effects have been precipitated, the principle has rarely
barred effective accommodation in accord with inclusive interest.
Hence, domestic jurisdiction means little more than a general
community concession of primar>', but not exclusive, competence
over matters arising and intimately concerned with aspects of
internal public order of states. Where such acts precipitate major
inclusive deprivations, jurisdiction is internationalized and
inclusive concern and measures become permissible.
The invocation of the principle of domestic jurisdiction for human rights rests on
a great misunderstanding in the contemporary nexus between human rights and matters of
"international concern."" The concept of domestic jurisdiction under international law
is not without exception, and those kinds of state conducts occurring within the territorial
bounds of the state but having a subsequent transnational effect upon others, have always
been subject to decisions and examinations on the international plane.
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The concept of domestic jurisdiction in the United Nations Security Council has
immensely devolved with practice. The Joint Declaration of the Security Council noted,
in its first head-of-state meeting, that:
The absence of war and military conflict amongst states does not in itself
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have
become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as
a whole needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these
^ 301
matters.
2. The Legitimacy of the Use of Economic Sanctions
To Enforce Human Rights by the Security Council of the United Nations
Although the United Nations Charter provides for the use of non-forcible
countermeasures in its institutional framework of enforcement, it nonetheless clearly
provides that unilateral third party remedies are not legal. When an act of aggression is
committed. Article 51 restrictively permits other states to take a provisional measure
together with the victim as a means of collective self-defense only until the Security
Council takes necessary measures to avert the danger. Except for this kind of situation,
states are not authorized, where their interest is not directly affected, to take any measure
because the power to determine the breach and to take the necessary measure to remedy
^^^ Note by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 5/23500 (January 31, 1992), at 3.
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The Security Council may determine the kind of non-forcible measures to apply in order to "give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
See Article 41 of the UN Charter.
Though it is not disputable that a state directly injured by the wrongdoing of another state may resort
to non forcible unilateral actions, including the use of economic sanctions, the picture is entirely different
when no party is directly affected by the international crime.
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DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 166(Weiler et al., eds.,1982)
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the wrongful act is exclusively vested in the Security Council. This can by analogy be
applied to situations of human rights the breach of which may constitute an international
crime or violations of erga omnes obligations. In such type of situations, unilateral
measures to enforce human rights is not legitimate and an enforcement measure must be
executed by the Security Council or other pertinent organ of the UN. Since the United
Nations, like all other international organizations, does not have a personality distinct
from those of states and is nothing more than the collection of its members, it can be
utilized as a forum where the non-material interest of the international community could
be legitimately defended and enforced.
Professor Riphagen, in his report to the International Law Commission
,
rendered
a view that a legal consequences follows upon states which commit an international crime
and thus entails the rights upon all states to take measures, including the right to take
307
reprisals. Despite this, he did not leave the exercise of this right at the discretion of
each and every state; he advocated that the exercise of these rights should be "subject
mutatis mutandis to the procedures embodied in the United Nations Charter with respect
to the maintenance of international peace and security." In like manner, Riphagen
proposed, in his part three of the draft article that the international Court of Justice be
vested with the power of qualifying certain "set of facts" as international crime. His
true tenet were in creating a court that would determine if certain acts constitute an
'''id
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international crime, and a security council which would thus determine and organize "the
rights and obligations of the world community arising as a result of such a crime" ,
which include the right to impose economic sanctions.
The competence of the United Nations in enforcing norms of human rights having
erga omnes character or peremptory character or violations of what may be labeled as
"international crimes," is legitimate rather than being merely fair or equitable. Graefrath
strongly asserts that the competence of the United Nations is automatic in any case of
international crime, which he characterizes as "a violation of obligation so essential to the
international community that we are faced with a matter of international concern."
Violations of human rights that fall under the definition of an international crime cease to
be matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the states directly affected,
because a breach of human rights is a "serious violation of an international obligation
essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community by
definition necessarily is an international affair which establishes the jurisdiction of the
United Nations."
The United Nations Security Council is the organ of the United Nations that can
legitimately take a mandatory measure in the event of a threat to international peace and
security. But it is within the practical reach of the Security Council to extend its
competence to all kinds of international crimes that may be of international concern.
Article 39 of the UN Charter, which authorized the Security Council with the
determination of the existence of peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.
See Graefrath, supra note 237, at 164.
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bestows upon the Security Council "sufficient margin and discretionary power" to
TIT
address areas of international crime. Once the Security Council determines that there is
a "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," or "act of aggression", it can resort to the
enforcement measures as provided under articles under articles 41 and 42, which leave
the Security council with the discretion of taking either a non-military measure. Article
41 empowers the Security Council to take measures not involving the use of armed force
and call upon member states to act in compliance of such measures.^ These decisions of
the Security Council have a mandator}' and binding nature on member states.
Although the Security Council has never attempted to adopt resolution to directly
address the human right situation in a member state, it has done so indirectly under the
rationale that a state's conduct within its own territorial bounds has a subsequent
transnational effect upon other states, thus giving rise to a threat to peace and security on
the international plane. The Security Council is now extending its jurisdiction to
matters which were once considered to fall under the exclusive internal affairs of states.
Human rights violation constituting international crime fall under Chapter VII
consequences, which means that they fall under the definition of "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression" as provided under article 39 of the Charter.
^'^
Id. at 164-165.
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These measures include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraph, radio, and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. See
Article 41.
For instance, the Haiti crisis which resulted from the removal from office of the elected government
and gave rise to a humanitarian crisis such as mass displacement of the population was considered to be "a
threat to international peace and security." See S.C. Res. 841, U.N.S.C.O.R, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg.,
ST/LIB/ 5.30(1993).
See Korkeakivi, supra note 242, at 90. For example, the Security Council adopted a resolution where
it "[cjondemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most
recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threatens international peace and
security...." See S.C. Res.688,aA'.5'.C.a^, 2982nd mtg. at 1.
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Nevertheless, in the present state of affairs in international relations, the fairness if
not the legitimacy of economic sanction may be challenged, for lack of fair representation
in international politics. The author of the paper conceives that enforcing human rights
violation by resorting to Chapter 7 would leave
,
at least in the present structure of the
Security Council, the whole mechanism of enforcement in the hands of the member states
of the Security Council, particularly in those of the Permanent Members. The
inappropriateness of giving "the task of identifying higher norms to a minority" and
placing a legal concept at the discretion of an organ which is basically political, would
3 1
7
have a negative consequence on the enforcement of human rights. For instance, the
continuance of United Nations sanctions against Iraq is said to have produced significant
humanitarian suffering, while it served no legitimate international goal. Creating an
enforcement organ in the United Nations which can function as the world police would be
indispensable to the reform of the present Security Council. The organ should become
more democratic and representative of the international community so that its mandatory
sanctions would be grounded on the conduct of states in reprisal of the law rather than as
an influence that tends to make international law subservient to the political goals of
powerful states.
Nevertheless, even as it is now, a collective sanction enforcement is legally and
politically more acceptable than unilateral economic sanctions, because the latter is more
vulnerable to the blatant manipulation of individual states.
""^/^.
at 91-92.
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See Krisknsky & Golove, supra note 156, at 3.
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Mat 4.
CHAPTER VI
THE PROHIBITION OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
UNDER OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS.
A. The GATT and other Multilateral Instruments
The GATT is a multilateral treaty in which the use of economic sanctions has
generally been prohibited with a certain exception. Article XI of the GATT
establishes the requirement of nondiscrimination between states in order to effect their
duties under article I of the GATT. As an exception, however, article XXI of the GATT
recognizes the power of a contracting party to take "any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. "(article XXI of the GATT).
Moreover, this article entitles member countries to take all necessary measures "in
pursuance of their obligation under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security." GATT 1994, as propounded in the Uruguay round discussions, has
not made any significant change in prohibiting the use of economic coercion except for
security reasons. The remedy for breach of the GATT rules takes several forms: a
withdrawal of economic concession, a most Favored Nations Treatment, or a tariff
agreement or any other discriminatory treatment pertaining to trade, and it is illegal
320
See The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, 1947.
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unless it can be justified for security reasons. Once again, the human rights violation in a
state does not, as a matter of practical reality, affect the security interest of another state,
321
except m certam narrow circumstances.
Regional instruments are also concurrent with the view that unilateral economic
sanctions are prohibited. The 1948 Bogota Charter, which created the Organization of
American States, offers a provision on the principles of nonintervention. It expressly
prohibits "the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to
force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind."
B. Regional Understandings on the Use of Economic Coercion
To Enforce Human Rights
According to its Resolution 1994/47 entitled "Human Rights and Unilateral
Economic Coercive Measures," the Commission on Human Rights requested the
Secretary General to submit a report to the Commission at its fifty-first session on the
economic coercive measures unilaterally implemented against the developing countries
for the realization of human rights. Accordingly, the Secretary General prepared a report
which contained statements and consultations from governments. Because of their
cultural peculiarity and their philosophy of human rights, the writer has elected the views
expresses by China and Indonesia. The views are summarized as follows.
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A human right violation in the territory of one state may give rise to a huge flux of refugees from the
violating state. For example, after the military coup overthrew the democratically elected government of
Haiti, a humanitarian crisis took over which resulted in the mass displacement of the population to the
neighboring state, thus endangering the security of other states. The Security Council decided that this state
of affairs constitutes a "threat to international peace and security" and imposed sanction on Haiti. See S.C.
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1. China
China expressed the view that a country's concept of human rights depends upon
its particular historical and cultural outlook and is also influenced by the social, political
and economic conditions of the individual country. "' Diversity in historical as well as
cultural background must be "acknowledged and respected" and the human rights
standards of certain countries are not absolute; consequently, total conformity should not
be required. " Tr>'ing to impose these values by conditioning economic assistance on
their implementation is not workable and is in contravention of the principle of normal
relations between states. " Chma also expressed the opinion that human rights issues are
not important in countries in which the primary necessities of life are not guaranteed and
where people do not have adequate food and clothing. These countries must focus their
efforts on their primary needs. China also underlined that efforts to pressure developing
countries through economic and political means to change their economic and political
paths contrary to their free will demonstrated not only a "lack of respect for other
countries' sovereignty [but also constituted] a brutal violation of their peoples' rights to
328
life and to development."
3 Indonesia
Unilateral economic coercion, be it in the form of an economic embargo or
conditionalities on the provision of economic aid, is not consonant with the very principle
'''
Id
''' Id
'''id
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of international cooperation which brought nations under the umbrella of brotherhood and
329
often results in unjustifiable harm to the innocent society and other vulnerable groups.
Indonesia also recognized the linkage between human rights and development.
Development produces "fuller and more secure human rights, while the implementation
and promotion of human rights as part of the national development efforts releases the
energies and genius of a people so that they can become more effective agents of their
own development." Indonesia, however, rejects the concept that links the
implementation of human rights as a political condition to the granting of economic
cooperation and assistance, for the effect of this linkage is counter productive and
detractive for the value of both.
C. Economic Sanctions and Their Negative impact On the Right to Development
The debate on human rights is not limited to controversy on the cultural
foundation of human rights. Nor is it confined to the issue of the primacy of civil and
political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the other.(refer back to
chapter III for an elaborate discussion). International development has been at the center
of the controversy, and human right have been placed somewhere in the paradigm of this
issue, depending upon which group of countries are propounding the idea.
The right to development is one of the constituent elements of the international
T •>
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law of development, the other being the right to seek development assistance. The
"' Id
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right to development was classified in a new categor>' of human rights which came to be
known as "third generation" human rights.
The concepts of "equity" and "common interest" are the rationales behind the
right to development and the responsibility of the international community, mainly its
developed members, to help achieve the objective of a "new international social
justice." ^' The following passage expresses the present trend of thinking in the area:
Development is a condition of all social life and therefore, an inherent
requirement of every obligation. Individuals and nations can only be
united with each other if they first exist. And, as we have just seen,
individual existence and the existence of human societies are a function of
progress, in other words, of the expansion of human potentialities and of a
corresponding increase in material goods. To reject development as a
primary obligation would be to reject the humanization of man and
therefore to deny the very possibility of a moral system.
""^
See BULAVIC, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 362(1993). The right to development is defined in the following
ways in the 1986 Declaration of the General Assembly on the Progressive Development of Principles of
International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order:
6.1 The right to development is a principle of public international law in general and of human right law in
particular, and is based on the right to self-determination of people;
6.2 By virtue of the right to development as a principle of human rights law, peoples are entitled to the
results of the efforts of states, individually and collectively, to achieve a proper social and international
order for the implementation of the human right, set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
through a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process based upon their free and active
participation.
6.3 TTie right to development as a principle of public international law imposes the cooperation of states for
the elaboration of civil, cultural, economic, political and social standards, embodied in the Charter of the
U.N. and the international Bill of Human Rights, based upon a common understanding of the generally
recognized human rights and of the principles of Public International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States. Id at 384.
^^^ See generally Id. at 375-390.
^^^
F.V. GARCI- AMADOR, THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: A NEW
DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 8 1 ( 1 990)(c///«g J.M. Domenach , Our Moral
Involvement in Development).
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The importance of the idea of development was so mush feh that the United
Nations General Assembly asserted, as early as 1979. in its resolution that "the right to
development is a human right and that equality of opportunity for development is as
much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within nations."
Very important to the content of the present paper is the negative impact of
economic coercion on the rights of development and the legal ramification thereof. It is
noteworthy that the General Assembly has designated the non-use of economic sanctions
as an important prerequisite in the realization of the right to development. It stated that
"no state may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent
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the free and full exercise of their inalienable rights."
Also evolving is the concept of the right to seek development assistance; this
approach is affirmed mainly by developing countries and is mostly rejected as
unacceptable by donor countries. A recent assertion to this effect is found in the General
Assembly resolution that was adopted at the World Conference of the United Nations
Decade for Women. It affirmed "the right of all developing countries to decide freely
from which countries and international agencies they will seek development assistance"
and condemned "all acts of destabilization, economic and political blackmail, threat or
sabotage..." Thus the resolution prohibited the use of economic coercion because its
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 34/46, November 23, 1979, para. 8. TTiis resolution reaffirmed the
concept that "the right to development is an inalienable right" and maintained that "international peace and
security are essential elements in achieving the full realization of the right to development," thereby
recognizing that "all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent." See UN
General Assembly Resolution 39/145. 1984, para. 8, 9, 10. For more discussion. See BULAJIC, supra note,
at 365 (citinp
E/CN.4/1 985/1 1/, Annex, at 1.
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See Resolution 26, On the Right ofAll Countries to Seek Development Assistance From Any And All
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use would inevitably have an impact the promotion of this right.
Sources Free From Threats And Attacks, Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for
Women. Copenhagen, July 14-30, 1980, UN, Doc. A/ Conf. 94/35, at 88.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Countermeasures under international law refer to a large category of sanctions.
Of particular interest is the economic sanction. Economic sanctions are countermeasures
that a state or group of states utilizes against another state with the purpose of inducing
compliance of the breached obligation or compliance with the demands of the same.
There has ever been a long standing debate on the issue of whether economic
sanctions are forcible or non-forcible countermeasures. The use of force as a form of
reprisal to enforce a legal right was abolished with the birth of the United Nations
Charter. Therefore, any attempt to inject economic sanction into the content of use of
force would automatically preclude the same as tools of self-remedy under international
law. For this reason, the issue of the validity of unilateral economic sanction must be
limited to those principles of international law that pertain to the use of non-forcible
countermeasures.
Countermeasures are principally divided into two types: reprisals and retorsions.
They differ in that one produces a legal effect and the other generally does not.
Retorsions is generally considered the attribute of the state's sovereignty whose exercise
does not give rise to the application or invocation of any prior breach of international law.
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Thus, retorsion is a countermeasure that a state may use to enforce its legal rights, to
induce compliance with its legal obligations or simply to perform an unfriendly act
toward another state. Although this right emanates basically from the sovereign right of a
state, it is not absolute, as its absolute unregulated exercise may contradict the exercise of
the same right by other states. The use of economic coercion as an act of retorsion should
be examined in light of the contemporar>' development of the law in the area and the rule
against non-intervention and sovereignty under general international law.
The principle of non-intervention, as practiced under customar\' international law,
is intended to protect states from being unduly influenced by other states. Although a
sense of disagreement prevails in drawing the line where a state's conduct ceases to be an
exercise of a sovereign power to an act of interference, many agree that the motive behind
a state's use of economic retorsion is of primary importance. The economic conduct
should not be designed to impact on or interfere with the political independence of a state.
If the economic coercion does not impact on the political independence of the state and is
meant to attain an economic benefit, it should be justifiable as a sovereign effect of the
sanction-imposing state and is permitted as a per se retortive right. The use of economic
measures that are utilized to influence the exercise of domestic jurisdiction of the other
state, including the treatment of a state of its own nationals may amount to acts of
intervention, for they interfere in the domestic decision making process of a state.
On the other hand, reprisals presuppose the taking of countermeasures, the
legality of which is solely dependent on the existence of a prior breach of an international
obligation of another state. The general acceptance of non-forcible countermeasures-
which may include the suspension or withdrawal of a legal obligation-as legitimate under
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international law, establishes per se the legal validity of economic coercion as a type of
non-forcible countermeasure.
Preceding any serious discussion of the international enforcement of human rights
must be a determination of those groups of human rights that have achieved the benefit of
universal acceptance. Only then can one talk about the universal enforcement of these
norms. It is an accepted fact that certain norms of human rights command special respect
and treatment as a result of their seriousness. A second question relates to the legal
mechanism through which these special norms can be protected. What is important to this
paper is how economic sanctions can be applied to enforce human rights.
A unilateral use of economic sanctions by states not directly affected by the
wrongful human rights practices on the nationals of a given state is illegitimate in light of
its legality, its vulnerability to political abuse and its effect on disrupting "international
legality." Remedies applied to violations of erga omnes obligations and violations of
international law that are categorically recognized as being international crimes should be
carried out through institutional frameworks that are representative of the interests of the
international community, unless the violations have caused material damage to the
interest of a particular state.
A few factors are important in this consideration. A number of "human rights"
are still debatable as to their universality, content importance and classification. In the
absence of any definitive understanding of the values of human rights whose ambiguity
generates from its origins, scope, hierarchy, classification, etc., some states may use such
mechanisms as instruments for imposing their values on other states. Such a unilateral
determination of sanctions leaves the sanction-imposing state to decide on certain matter
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with ethno-centric bias which in return gives rise to the imposition of values . Therefore,
the validity of unilateral sanction can be challenged on the ground that the cultural and
political values of the country enforcing the sanction may have a discernible effect in the
face of the still controverted universality of all kinds of human rights. Second, a
unilateral determination of the human rights situation in a given country is very much
influenced by consideration of subjective as opposed to objective considerations.
Moreover, breaches of human rights obligations would be subjected to an arbitrary
unilateral use of sanction which leaves its enforcement uncoordinated and ineffective.
Therefore, unilateral sanctions are very likely to be abused. Indirectly injured states
should not be allowed to use economic sanctions, either unilaterally or multilaterally.
Collective sanctions above all desirable due to their legitimacy, which emanates
from the multilateral agreement of states such as the Charter of the UN. They can be
imposed only for violations of those kinds of human rights norms which have a universal
acceptance. Universal enforcement of human rights is permissible only in cases of breach
of norms of special importance such as international crimes and obligation erga omnes.
The practices of genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, torture, etc., are included in the
special group of human rights that have either a peremptory or erga omnes character or
fall under the international criminal law regime. Consequently, the international
community as a whole has the right to take necessary measures to protect these basic
rights. The international community should act through an international organization
having a universal nature.
The advantage of collective sanctions is twofold. First, the larger the number of
nations engaged in the sanction, the lower the likelihood that the target state could easily
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circumvent the economic impact. A universal sanction, coupled with the target's
relatively expedient economic loss, may minimize the time that economic sanction must
be used to be effective, resulting in a lower threshold of suffering of the innocent
population of the target state. Second, collective sanction is usually imposed as a result
of a violation of a certain legal or customar>' norm. The endorsement of sanction by an
international organization, therefore, reflects the importance of the breached norm to the
world community at large, thus eliminating the imposition of controversial values.
Sanctions carried out by an international organization also are vested with a strong moral
power, compared with that of sanctions directed unilaterally, since the international
organization has a broad perspective rather than a narrowly defined national or hidden
interest.
The authority of the United Nations to act in the field of human rights is
sometimes challenged on the ground that such an exercise violates the principle of non-
intervention as improvised under article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations.
Nonetheless, the UN Charter has envisaged the promotion and protection of human rights
as one of the purposes of the organization. Therefore, any activity of the United Nations
in this respect should not be taken as an illegal exercise of power.
The enforcement of norms of human rights should also be cognizant of such
factors as culture, stage of economic development, etc. Enforcement by the United
Nations removes the fear that the values of some cultures will be imposed on others. The
United Nations can be utilized as an international forum through which universally
recognized notions and principles of human rights may be implemented rather than values
of a peculiar or limited acceptance. Unless economic sanctions are used in a systematic
LAW LIBRARY
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and organized way, their liabilities may outweigh their benefits and consequently produce
detrimental effects on the interest of populations they are supposed to help.
Generally, universal economic sanctions as a tool for enforcing human rights
have two clear advantages over unilateral economic sanctions: legitimacy and
relative/comparative altruism. The use of these sanctions acquire the advantage of
altruistic humanitarian concern, as compared with camouflaged human right concerns
that are mainly instigated by self-interest. Therefore, norms of human rights of universal
character have to be enforced through an institution having a similar feature.
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